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ON BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND DISCRETIONARY
ORIGINALISM
Ronald Turner*
Abstract
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court issued its seminal decision
in Brown v. Board of Education.1 Interpreting and applying the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, a unanimous Court held “that in the field of public education
the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal.”2 In so holding, the Court determined
that it could “not turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.”3 The
Court chose, instead, to “consider public education in the light of its full
development and its present place in American life throughout the
Nation.”4
Is Brown consistent with—can the Court’s separate-but-equal-isunconstitutional holding be justified by—originalism? This Article
examines originalists’ affirmative answers to this question. Originalism
seeks to determine the fixed meaning of constitutional text at the time of
its adoption and emphasizes constraining interpreters’ discretion and
ability to introduce and act upon their personal predilections, preferences,
values, and beliefs when engaged in constitutional interpretation. This
Article’s focus is on how the “Is Brown originalist?” query addresses the
claim that originalist analyses of that issue performed the posited
constraint and discretion-limiting functions. As argued herein,
originalism is in fact a discretion-laden methodology, providing readers
of constitutional text with the freedom and flexibility to make discretionary
and outcome-influential choices as they interpret and apply the document.
Discretionary originalism, as employed by those seeking to demonstrate
that Brown was rightly decided as an original matter, calls into question
the methodology’s capacity to meaningfully constrain, in a principled and
consistent manner, originalists engaged in the enterprise of interpreting
the Fourteenth Amendment.
*
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University. The author acknowledges and is thankful for the research support provided by
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1
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2
Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
3
Id. at 492.
4
Id. at 492–93.
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Methodologies are not strongly constraining. That is in large measure the
burden of American constitutional history.5
In the abstract, a legal interpretive theory ought to be able to say “theories
generate results; results don’t generate theories.”6
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court issued its seminal decision in Brown
v. Board of Education.7 Interpreting and applying the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,8 a unanimous Court held
“that in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”9 In so holding, the Court
determined that “we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.”10 The Court chose,
instead, to “consider public education in the light of its full development and its
present place in American life throughout the Nation.”11
The Brown Court did not employ originalism, the label given to a family of
theories that consider “the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of
its initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the
present.”12 Is the result in Brown consistent with—can that result be squared with—
originalism? For originalists, much rides on the answer(s) to this question. There is
a “widespread belief that the [Court’s] decision was inconsistent with the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.”13 Michael McConnell has observed
that the “supposed inconsistency between Brown and the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment has assumed enormous importance in modern debate over
constitutional theory. Such is the moral authority of Brown that if any particular
theory does not produce the conclusion that Brown was correctly decided, the theory

5

John Harrison, On the Hypotheses That Lie at the Foundations of Originalism, 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 473, 481 (2008).
6
Will Baude, Does Originalism Justify Brown, and Why Do We Care So Much?,
WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2014/01/29/does-originalism-justify-brown-and-why-do-we-care-so-much/, archived at
http://perma.cc/67MK-R3EG.
7
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
9
Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
10
Id. at 492.
11
Id. at 492–93.
12
Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599
(2004).
13
FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 92 (2013).
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is seriously discredited.”14 The late Robert Bork commented, “Brown has become
the high ground of constitutional theory. Theorists of all persuasions seek to capture
it, because any theory that seeks acceptance must, as a matter of psychological fact,
if not of logical necessity, account for the result in Brown.”15 “Precisely because
Brown has become the crown jewel of the United States Reports,” Pamela Karlan
has observed, “every constitutional theory must claim Brown for itself. A
constitutional theory that cannot produce the result reached in Brown . . . is a
constitutional theory without traction.”16
This Article examines and critiques originalists’ efforts to demonstrate that
Brown was correctly decided. More specifically, the Article argues that these efforts
are grounded in discretion-laden originalist methodologies that allow—indeed
depend upon—the originalist interpreter’s freedom and flexibility to make outcomeinfluential choices when formulating and applying originalist theories. This is a
matter of significance, for originalism has been championed as a methodology that
constrains the ability of interpreters (including judges) to resort to and implement
14

Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L.
REV. 947, 952 (1995).
15
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 77 (1990).
16
Pamela S. Karlan, Lecture, What Can Brown® Do for You?: Neutral Principles and
the Struggle over the Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1060 (2009); see also
GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY
105 (1992) (“The acid test of originalism, as indeed of any theory of constitutional
adjudication, is its capacity to justify what is now almost universally regarded as the Supreme
Court’s finest hour: its decision in Brown v. Board of Education . . . .” (citation omitted));
KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS 68 (2006) (while “[s]ome originalists still take the position that Brown
exemplifies illegitimate judicial decision-making in the name of a desirable result,” “most
originalists are more concerned to explain how Brown is actually correct on originalist
grounds, thinking (rightly) that an approach to constitutional interpretation under which
Brown was wrongly decided will have little appeal for the American public.”); ADRIAN
VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL
INTERPRETATION 280 (2006) (“Some have claimed that any respectable account of
constitutional adjudication must be able to justify Brown. In view of such claims, theorists
have gone to implausible lengths to square their accounts with Brown.”); J. HARVIE
WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 17 (2012) (“Brown affords living
constitutionalists a nonoriginalist case whose ultimate salutary effect on American equality
properly renders the result nearly immune from criticism.”); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s
Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 21 (2006)
(discussing Brown and the claim that “because the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment cannot deliver the desired result, the meaning of the text must be changed by
judges to something that is morally superior” and guessing “that this argument motivates the
approach of ninety percent of constitutional law professors.”); Michael C. Dorf, Equal
Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 958 (2002) (“[C]onservatives who are
generally sympathetic to originalism cannot openly say that Brown v. Board of Education
was wrongly decided” and they “concoct implausible accounts of the Reconstruction Era
understanding of segregation.” (citation omitted)).
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their ideological and political preferences as they interpret constitutional
provisions.17 But originalism is, in fact, a discretionary methodology providing
ample room for originalists to introduce and act upon their personal predilections,
preferences, values, and beliefs as they interpret and apply the Constitution.
As developed herein, discretionary originalism provides originalists with
several interpretive choice points. First, originalism “is itself a choice.”18 Interpreters
may choose from a menu of methodologies when considering constitutional
questions, including originalism, living constitutionalism, common law
constitutionalism, history, text, purpose, precedent, doctrine, prudence, structure,
political process concerns, ethical concerns, social values, decisional consequences,
and moral readings of the document.19 Originalists thus choose that methodology as
a preferred or the only legitimate interpretive theory. That choice may or may not be
the correct one, but it is a choice nonetheless.20

17

See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1743, 1777 (2013) (noting the premise that “judges will be inclined to implement their
political or policy preferences; if that were not the case, then the self-constraining advantage
of originalism, textualism, and rule following would be unnecessary.”).
18
Eric Posner, Originalism Means Not Always Getting What You Want, ERIC POSNER
(Feb. 10, 2014), http://ericposner.com/originalism-means-not-always-getting-what-youwant/, archived at http://perma.cc/WAS5-ST82.
19
For discussions of interpretive methodologies, see generally PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, at xvi (1991) (discussing how to choose from among six
types of constitutional arguments “without sacrificing either legitimacy or justice”); PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 9–124 (1982) (describing
six types of constitutional arguments); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING A
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 3 (2008) (exploring the “role of the United States Supreme
Court in interpreting the Constitution”); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL
READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2 (1996) (advocating for a “moral reading” of
the Constitution); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 181 (1980) (arguing for a “representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review”);
DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 1–5 (2010) (rejecting originalism and
advocating for “a common law approach to the Constitution”).
20
For an early case in which the Supreme Court chose not to adopt an originalist
approach, see Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934):
If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it
means to-day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must
be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and
outlook of their time, would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own
refutation.
Id. at 442–43; but see id. at 448–49 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (“A provision of the
Constitution, it is hardly necessary to say, does not admit of two distinctly opposite
interpretations. It does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely different thing at
another time . . . . [The meaning of] the contract impairment clause, when framed and adopted
. . . means the same now.”).
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Second, originalists may choose from different originalist theories, including
original intent, original understanding, original public meaning, original methods,
and framework originalism.21 These “diverse and, to some extent, conflicting
theories”22 have been developed over time as originalism was “working itself pure”23
and comprise “big tent” originalism unified “by a core commitment to the
interpretive primacy of the ‘fixed’ meaning of the constitutional text at the time of
enactment.”24
Third, originalists enjoy discretion in framing the inquiry and in choosing what
they consider to be “the proper level of generality at which a right should be
characterized.”25 Framing an issue and characterizing a right broadly (for example,
the right to a public school education) or narrowly and more precisely (for example,
the right to attend a racially integrated or desegregated public school) is a critical
descriptive and normative matter, influenced by an interpreter’s value choices and
substantive positions.26
Fourth, originalist interpreters choose the parameters of the evidentiary inquiry
relative to the constitutional question under consideration. Are the evidence and
facts relevant to the “Is Brown originalist?” inquiry those found in congressional and
ratification debates over the Fourteenth Amendment? In Reconstruction-era
understandings of the rights protected by and falling outside the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment? What is the (is there a) relevant time period for an
originalist evaluation of issues involving the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection mandate? Is it the amendment proposal and ratification period of 1866–
1868 or some other time period? How does interpreter discretion affect and guide
the answers to these questions?
The ensuing discussion of Brown and discretionary originalism unfolds in four
parts. Part II provides an overview of and commentary on constitutional originalism
and certain originalist theories (original intent, original understanding, original
public meaning, and framework originalism) included under the originalism
umbrella. Part III considers race, racism, and Reconstruction and the factual and
legal backdrop preceding and culminating in the 1868 adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In addition, Part III focuses on three separate and distinct categories of
rights recognized in the Reconstruction era—civil, political, and social—and
21

See infra Part II.
Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L.
REV. 493, 573 (2013).
23
Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1114 (2003).
24
Williams, supra note 22, at 573.
25
Patrick S. Shin, Discrimination Under a Description, 47 GA. L. REV. 1, 33–34
(2012).
26
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 73
(1991); see also WILKINSON, supra note 16, at 52 (“[D]ebates rage about the original
understanding of the level of generality of the equal protection clause. Does it forbid
discrimination on the basis of race? Or does it only forbid discrimination against African
Americans?” (citation omitted)).
22
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explicates the significance of and difficulties presented by this trichotomy of rights
for those who contend that the result in Brown can be squared with originalism. Part
IV turns to Brown’s interment of the separate-but-equal doctrine in the context of
public school education and notes post-Brown arguments and actions by supporters
of the segregationist status quo invalidated by the Court’s decision, including the
originalist critique of Brown made in the “Southern Manifesto.” Part V’s discussion
of originalism and Brown identifies and critiques the various discretionary moves
and outcome-influential interpretive choices made by originalists. As argued in that
Part, these moves and choices provide originalists with various interpretive paths to
their desired Brown-is-originalist terminus, thereby calling into question the theory’s
capacity to meaningfully constrain, in a principled and consistent manner, originalist
interpreters of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Article concludes that the instances
of discretionary originalism examined herein in support of the Brown-is-originalist
position avoid the undesirable result and outcome—because school segregation did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, Brown was wrongly decided—of an
undiluted and unflinching originalism.
II. ORIGINALISM(S): OLD AND NEW
As previously noted, originalists have developed and may choose from a menu
of differing originalist theories.27 This Part provides a survey of various originalisms
and their theoretical underpinnings, as well as scholarly critiques identifying the
weaknesses of the theories discussed herein and responses thereto. This account and
analysis of the development of diverse and sometimes conflicting originalist theories
provides the background for the question presented and discussed in this Article:
whether the result in Brown v. Board of Education can be squared with originalist
interpretations and applications of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As noted by Keith Whittington, originalism is both old and new.28 Old
Originalism,29 emphasizing the intent of the framers of constitutional provisions,
was said to limit judicial interpreters’ opportunity to substitute their personal
preferences for constitutional mandates and the values of the people.30 Critics of
certain decisions of the Warren Court employed original-intent originalism in
furtherance of the desired ends of limiting judicial discretion and promoting judicial

27

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See Whittington, supra note 12, at 599.
29
Id. at 599–603.
30
See Jonathan R. Macey, Originalism as an “Ism,” 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301,
302 (1996) (“[O]riginalism is defensible not because it restrains judges completely, or even
well, but because it restrains judges better than alternative methods of judging.”); Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (1989) (stating that
originalism is “less likely to aggravate the most significant weakness of the system of judicial
review,” that “judges will mistake their own predilections for the law.”); Whittington, supra
note 12, at 602 (stating that the “primary commitment” of Old Originalism “was to judicial
restraint.”).
28
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restraint.31 In their view, this form of originalism would constrain a court that was
making rather than interpreting the law32 and was “the movement to curb the
pretensions of the Warren Court and return the meaning of the Constitution to what
it said.”33
Unlike Old Originalism’s focus on the private and subjective intentions of the
Framers and the understanding of ratifiers of constitutional text,34 New Originalism
seeks to determine the original public meaning of constitutional text35: “the meaning
that the words and phrases had (or would have had) to ordinary members of the
public.”36 For the original public meaning originalist, “the meaning of each
provision of the Constitution becomes fixed when that provision is framed and
ratified,” with “meaning” referring to “meaning in the linguistic sense.”37 This
meaning “has the force of law” and, as “the supreme law of the land,” binds courts
and officials.38 While one analyst has argued that New Originalism “is grounded
more clearly and firmly in an argument about what judges are supposed to be
interpreting and what that implies, rather than an argument about how best to limit
judicial discretion,”39 another scholar has suggested that New Originalism
“continues to a substantial degree to emphasize judicial constraint—in the sense of
promising to narrow the discretion of judges.”40
The rubric of constitutional originalism is best described as an array of
constitutional originalisms. Interpreters who choose to employ originalism may
select from a menu of originalist theories, including those discussed in this Part:
original intent, original understanding, original public meaning, and framework
originalism.41
31

See Brad Snyder, The Former Clerks Who Nearly Killed Judicial Restraint, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2129, 2147 (2014); Whittington, supra note 12, at 599–600.
32
See Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 707, 711 (2011) (noting this view).
33
Antonin Scalia et al., In Memoriam, Robert H. Bork, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
1231, 1233 (2013).
34
See Whittington, supra note 12, at 607–12.
35
Id. at 609–10.
36
Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 2–3 (2011).
37
Id. at 2.
38
Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted).
39
Whittington, supra note 12, at 609.
40
Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 751
(2011).
41
Other originalist approaches not discussed in the next Part include: (1) Original
expected application originalism, which “asks how people living at the time the text was
adopted would have expected it would be applied using language in its ordinary sense (along
with some terms of art).” JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 7 (2011); Lawrence B.
Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 935 (2009)
(original expected application originalism focuses on “expectations about the application of
that meaning to future cases” and not on the linguistic meaning of the text). (2) Originalmethods originalism, a theory relying on the “interpretive methods that the constitutional
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A. Original Intent
The theory of original intent originalism posits that the intent of those who
drafted and framed constitutional text must be discerned and given effect when
interpreting the Constitution.
During the United States Senate Judiciary Committee’s 1967 confirmation
hearings on the nomination of Thurgood Marshall to the United States Supreme
Court, North Carolina Senator Sam Ervin (a critic of Brown v. Board of Education)
asked Marshall the following question: “Is not the role of the Supreme Court simply
to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the
people who ratified the Constitution?”42 Marshall responded in the affirmative to
Ervin’s question while also stating that “the Constitution was meant to be a living
document.”43
A few years later, another Court nominee, William H. Rehnquist, assured the
Judiciary Committee that he would not “disregard the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and change it to achieve a result that . . . might be desirable for

enactors would have deemed applicable” at the time of the adoption of a constitutional
provision. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751,
751 (2009); see also JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE
GOOD CONSTITUTION 82 (2013) [hereinafter MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND
THE GOOD CONSTITUTION] (arguing that “[a] good constitution enacted under supermajority
rules should be interpreted according to its original meaning,” with that meaning “determined
using the interpretive methods that the enactors would have deemed applicable to the
constitution.”). But see Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About
Constitutional Assumptions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 615, 660 (2009) (arguing that the McGinnis
and Rappaport approach is “needlessly confusing” and that “even if a majority of those who
approved a constitution had other methods of interpretation in mind, their assumed or
expected methods did not thereby become a part of the meaning of the text.”); Kurt T. Lash,
Originalism All The Way Down?, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 149, 165 (2015) (reviewing
MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION, supra) (arguing that
McGinnis and Rappaport fail to recognize that methods of constitutional interpretation were
under-resolved and were the subject of debate at the time of the Founding). (3) Decisional
originalism, Steven Smith’s tentative label for an alternative to original-meaning originalism
calls for constitutional interpretation and adjudication respecting, as the controlling criterion,
the original decisions of lawmakers. See Steven D. Smith, Meanings or Decisions? Getting
Originalism Back on Track, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (Dec. 2, 2014),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/meanings-or-decisions-getting-originalismback-on-track/, archived at http://perma.cc/3KG5-P2MW.
42
Nomination of Thurgood Marshall: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
90th Cong. 49 (1967) (statement of Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary).
43
Id.
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society.”44 In a subsequent law review article, Justice (later Chief Justice) Rehnquist
expressed his concern about living constitutionalism and “the substitution of some
other set of values for those which may be derived from the language and the intent
of the framers.”45 In his view, the Founding Fathers intended the Constitution itself
to suggest answers to the manifold problems that they knew would confront
succeeding generations: “The Constitution that they drafted was indeed intended to
endure indefinitely, but the reason for this very well-founded hope was the general
language by which national authority was granted to Congress and the
Presidency.”46
Original intent was also advocated by “the father of originalism,”47 Robert
Bork, as “the only legitimate basis for constitutional decisionmaking.”48 In his
influential article Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, Bork
urged that one method of deriving rights from the Constitution “is to take from the
document rather specific values that text or history show the framers actually to have
intended and which are capable of being translated into principled rules.”49
Raoul Berger’s 1977 book Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of
the Fourteenth Amendment championed what Berger termed the “‘original
intention’—shorthand for the meaning attached by the Framers to the words they
employed in the Constitution and its Amendments.”50 In support of his position,
Berger quoted the “archradical” Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner:
Every Constitution embodies the principles of its framers. It is a transcript
of their minds. If its meaning in any place is open to doubt, or if words are
used which seem to have no fixed signification, we cannot err if we turn
to the framers; and their authority increases in proportion to the evidence
which they left on the question.51
In a 1985 speech to the American Bar Association, Reagan Administration
Attorney General Edwin Meese shared with the audience his view that

44

Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 19 (1971) (statement of Sen. John L. McClellan,
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
45
William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 695
(1976).
46
Id. at 699.
47
Steven G. Calabresi & Lauren Pope, Judge Robert H. Bork and Constitutional
Change: An Essay on Ollman v. Evans, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 155, 155 (2013).
48
Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 823, 823 (1986).
49
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 17 (1971).
50
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 402 (2d ed. 1997).
51
Id. at 409–10 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 677 (1866)).
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[a]s the ‘faithful guardians of the Constitution,’ the judges were expected
to resist any political effort to depart from the literal provisions of the
Constitution. The text of the document and the original intention of those
who framed it would be the judicial standard in giving effect to the
Constitution.52
Meese announced that the Reagan Administration would “press for a jurisprudence
of original intention. In the cases that we file and those we join as amicus, we will
endeavor to resurrect the original meaning of constitutional provisions . . . .”53
The theory of original-intent originalism was persuasively critiqued. Three
months after Meese’s speech to the ABA, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. addressed
“those who find legitimacy in fidelity to what they call ‘the intentions of the
Framers.’”54 “In its most doctrinaire incarnation, this view demands that Justices
discern exactly what the Framers thought about the question under consideration and
simply follow that intention in resolving the case before them.”55 Justice Brennan
observed that this view “feigns self-effacing deference to the specific judgments of
those who forged our original social compact” and “is little more than arrogance
cloaked as humility. It is arrogant to pretend that from our vantage we can gauge
accurately the intent of the Framers on application of principle to specific,
contemporary questions.”56 Stating that the Framers did not agree about the meaning
or application of specific constitutional provisions and “hid their differences in
cloaks of generality,” he noted that “it is far from clear whose intention is relevant—
that of the drafters, the congressional disputants, or the ratifiers in the states?”57
Academic critiques of original-intent originalism were powerful and
devastating.58 Ronald Dworkin opined, “there is no such thing as the intention of the
Framers waiting to be discovered . . . .”59 Paul Brest argued that it is impossible to
determine institutional intent by counting the “individual intention-votes” of “a
single multimember law-making body, and a fortiori where the assent of several
such bodies were required.”60 While one framer of a constitutional provision may
have had a “determinate intent,” other Framers may have had an indeterminate intent
or no intent whatsoever, and those with an indeterminate intent may have “intended
52
Edwin Meese III, U.S. Att’y Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association
(July 9, 1985), in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 47–48 (Steven G.
Calabresi ed., 2007).
53
Id. at 54.
54
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium (Oct.
12, 1985), in ORIGINALISM, supra note 52, at 58.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 248
(2009) (describing the criticism of original-intent originalism as “savage”).
59
Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 477 (1981).
60
Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 214 (1980).
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to delegate to future decisionmakers the authority to apply the clause in light of the
general principles underlying it.”61 Referring to statutory interpretation practices and
canons of the eighteenth through the mid-nineteenth century, Brest argued that those
practices “suggest[ ] that the adopters assumed—if they assumed anything at all—a
mode of interpretation that was more textualist than intentionalist.”62 He also made
the critical point that one must determine the level of generality and abstraction at
which the purported collective intention is to be understood.63
In another influential critique, H. Jefferson Powell argued “[t]he Philadelphia
framers’ primary expectation regarding constitutional interpretation was that the
Constitution, like any other legal document, would be interpreted in accord with its
express language.”64 He found “no indication that they expected or intended future
interpreters to refer to any extratextual intentions revealed in the convention’s
secretly conducted debates.”65 As noted by Lawrence Solum, “[t]he strongest
implication of [Powell’s] article is that original intentions originalism is a selfeffacing theory because it requires that the Framers’ intentions regarding
interpretation be respected, but those intentions require that the Framers’ intentions
be disregarded.”66
B. Original Understanding
In the wake of the aforementioned critiques of original-intent originalism, the
focus of originalist theory shifted to the original understanding of the Constitution’s
ratifiers.67 This move responded to the argument that the document drafted at the
Philadelphia Convention and by the Congresses proposing amendments thereto had
no legal effect until they were approved by ratifying conventions and state
legislatures.68 Framers’ intention did not control; “it is what the Ratifiers understood
the Framers to have intended or, better yet, what the Ratifiers understood the words
and phrases themselves to mean that should count. This might be subtly (or
significantly) different from what was in fact subjectively intended by the
provision’s drafters.”69
Robert Bork, at one time a proponent of original-intent originalism,70 embraced
a different version of the methodology in his book The Tempting of America: The
61

Id. at 214, 216.
Id. at 215.
63
See id. at 216–17.
64
H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 903 (1985).
65
Id.
66
Solum, supra note 41, at 929.
67
See id. at 930 (discussing original understanding originalism’s emphasis on “either
the state ratifying conventions understood as corporate bodies or of the individuals who
attended the ratifying conventions and voted in favor of ratification.”).
68
See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 23, at 1137.
69
Id.
70
See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
62
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Political Seduction of the Law.71 Remarking that original-intent originalism “is now
very much out of favor among the theorists of the field,”72 he wrote that
[s]ecret reservations or intentions count for nothing. All that counts is how
the words used in the Constitution would have been understood at the time.
The original understanding is thus manifested in the words used and in
secondary materials, such as debates at the conventions, public discussion,
newspaper articles, dictionaries in use at the time, and the like.73
Reliance on ratifier understanding does not obviate many of the problematic
aspects of original-intent originalism and the “paradox of numerosity.”74 Efforts to
determine an operative ratifiers’ understanding present the difficult problem of
ascertaining the intention not of one group of Framers, but of many groupings of
persons meeting in a number of ratifying conventions.75 By this logic,
The individual intentions of drafters or adopters must be shared by a
sufficient number of delegates to count as law, but unless those intentions
are understood at a level of generality too high to give practical guidance,
it will often be the case that individual Framers—and a fortiori individual
adopters—had either an indeterminate intent or none at all with respect to
particular questions.76
C. Original Public Meaning
The discussion now turns to “the mainstream of originalist theory”: original
public meaning originalism.77
In a 1986 speech, United States Court of Appeals Judge (later Supreme Court
Justice) Antonin Scalia stated that he “ought to campaign to change the label [of
originalism] from the Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original
Meaning.”78 Focusing on the “original intent of the Constitution,” rather than on the
“original intent of the Framers,” he stated that one must ask, “What was the most
plausible meaning of the words of the Constitution to the society that adopted it—

71

BORK, supra note 15, at 143–44.
Id. at 143.
73
Id. at 144.
74
Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1687
(2012).
75
See Solum, supra note 41, at 930.
76
Greene, supra note 74, at 1687.
77
Solum, supra note 36, at 9–10.
78
Justice Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on
Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 101, 106 (1987).
72

2015]

BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

1155

regardless of what the Framers might secretly have intended?”79 For Justice Scalia,
those who invoked the “original intent” of the “Founding Fathers” invoked them as
“strong indications of what the most knowledgeable people of the time understood
the words to mean.”80
Addressing the difference between original intent and original meaning
originalism in 1997, Justice Scalia remarked, “What I look for in the Constitution is
precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the
original draftsmen intended.”81 In his view, “the Great Divide with regard to
constitutional interpretation is not that between Framers’ intent and objective
meaning, but rather that between original meaning . . . and current meaning.”82 The
Justice rejected the notion of “The Living Constitution, a body of law that . . . grows
and changes from age to age, in order to meet the needs of a changing society.”83 “It
certainly cannot be said that a constitution naturally suggests changeability; to the
contrary, its whole purpose is to prevent change—to embed certain rights in such a
manner that future generations cannot readily take them away.”84

79

Id. at 103 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 576–77 (2008) (“[T]he Constitution was written to be understood by the
voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from
technical meaning,” including “an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical
meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.”
(quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)).
80
Scalia, supra note 78, at 103; see also id. at 104–05 (arguing that “it is perfectly clear
that the original intent was that the Constitution would be interpreted according to its original
meaning” and citing Alexander Hamilton and James Madison in support of that position).
81
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
82
Id. Original meaning versus current meaning was discussed in a recent interview in
which Justice Scalia was asked whether the Fourteenth Amendment applied to sex
discrimination. It did not, he stated: “You do not need the Constitution to reflect the wishes
of the current society. Certainly the Constitution does not require discrimination on the basis
of sex. The only issue is whether it prohibits it. It doesn’t. Nobody ever thought that that’s
what it meant. Nobody ever voted for that.” The Originalist, CAL. LAW. (Jan. 2011),
http://www.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?eid=913358, archived at http://perma.cc/QQL58GAL.
83
Scalia, supra note 81, at 38.
84
Id. at 40; see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 92 (2012) (espousing original-meaning originalism and
renouncing the search for historical intent). Justice Scalia at one time confessed that he was
“a faint-hearted originalist” and could not imagine upholding a statute imposing the
punishment of flogging. Scalia, supra note 30, at 864. He recently stated that he now attempts
to be a stout-hearted and honest originalist. Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia,
N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 6, 2013), http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/,
archived at http://perma.cc/8MMS-2ZV2; see also MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT:
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 165 (2013) (noting that Justice Scalia “has ‘recanted’
being a ‘faint-hearted originalist.’”).
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Justice Scalia has also observed that the “greatest defect” of originalism “is the
difficulty of applying it correctly” and that “it is often exceedingly difficult to plumb
the original understanding of an ancient text.”85 Done correctly, the methodology
“requires the consideration of an enormous mass of material” and “immersing
oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the time—somehow placing
out of mind knowledge that we have which an earlier age did not, and putting on
beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that are not those of our
day.”86
Consider Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen’s theory of original,
objective-public-meaning textualism.87 They posit that the “interpreter who applies
the Constitution as law must be bound by the meaning of the words and phrases
written down in the text,”88 with that meaning faithfully applied “in accordance with
the meaning they would have had at the time they were adopted as law.”89 For
Kesavan and Paulsen, the originalist inquiry asks how constitutional words and
phrases “would have been understood by a hypothetical, objective, reasonably wellinformed reader of those words and phrases, in context, at the time they were
adopted, and within the political and linguistic community in which they were
adopted.”90 Where an answer to a constitutional question is not expressly answered
by the text, they instruct that reference should be made to second-best sources of
original public meaning, including early treatises on the Constitution, the public
debates of the ratifying conventions, and the public writings of the Anti-Federalists
and the Federalists.91
Another proponent of original public meaning originalism, Gary Lawson, does
not focus on the original meaning held by actual people. Instead, he asks
85

Scalia, supra note 30, at 856.
Id. at 856–57.
87
See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 23, at 1132.
88
Id. at 1129.
89
Id. at 1131.
90
Id. at 1132.
91
Id. at 1148–53. “[A]cademic writers and jurists have cited the Federalist Papers as
evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution more than any other historical source
except the text of the Constitution itself.” Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the
Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87
B.U. L. REV. 801, 802 (2007). In assessing the evidentiary value of the Federalist Papers it
should be noted that “there is substantial reason to doubt that many of the ratifiers actually
read the Federalist Papers.” Id. at 822. The Papers “had a very small circulation,” id. at 827,
and, given the secrecy of the Constitutional Convention, the Papers’ authors “could have
distorted purposefully (or even accidentally) the original intent without much fear of
contradiction.” Id. at 836; see also JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN CREATION: TRIUMPHS AND
TRAGEDIES AT THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC 117 (2007) (“[T]here is reason to believe
that The Federalist has exerted more influence on modern-day constitutional arguments than
on the eighteenth-century debates that occasioned it. Its distribution beyond New York was
spotty; with a few exceptions, the language of the essays was inaccessible to ordinary
readers; and its greatest impact was to galvanize support among Federalist delegates already
committed to ratification.”).
86
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how a fully informed public audience, knowing all that there is to know
about the Constitution and the surrounding world, would understand a
particular provision. Actual historical understandings are, of course,
relevant to that inquiry, but they do not conclude or define the inquiry—
nor are they even necessarily the best available evidence.92
Thus,
the touchstone is not the specific thoughts in the heads of any particular
historical people—whether drafters, ratifiers, or commentators, however
distinguished and significant within the drafting and ratification processes
they may have been—but rather the hypothetical understandings of a
reasonable person who is artificially constructed by lawyers. The thoughts
of historical figures may be relevant, but the ultimate inquiry is legal.93
The meaning of a constitutional provision is therefore determined by “the mental
states that would have been held by some person or persons who might or might not
ever have actually existed under conditions that might or might not ever have been
actually realized.”94
Original-meaning originalism also implicates the issue of the meaning of
“meaning.” “‘Meaning’ is a capacious concept, and indeed, it has many different
meanings, including semantic content, purposes, intentions, practical entailments,
and cultural associations. Conceived most broadly, ‘meaning’ includes a vast array
of cultural associations, traditions, conventions, and background assumptions.”95
Given the ambiguity of the word “meaning,” any discernment or “version of
‘original meaning’ in legal interpretation must inevitably carve out a subset of these
cultural meanings and treat this portion as remaining in legal force over time.”96
Selection of a subset of “meaning” is not “natural and value-free”; it is a
discretionary choice informed by an interpreter’s view and understanding of the
purposes of the Constitution and of constitutional interpretation.97 Whatever choice

92

Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002).
Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006); see also id. at 72 (The hypothetical reasonable person “obviously
had a high degree of intelligence and education” and a “strong commitment to human reason”
and, whether or not a lawyer, “is learned in the law.”); id. at 73 (The “reasonable person of
the law” is “highly intelligent and educated and capable of making and recognizing subtle
connections and inferences” and “is familiar with the peculiar language and conceptual
structure of the law.”).
94
Id. at 56.
95
Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815,
828 (2012).
96
Id.
97
Id.
93
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should be made “cannot be settled by the meaning of ‘meaning,’ much less the
meaning of ‘original.’”98
As with other originalist theories, original public meaning originalism has been
the subject of critique. Richard Kay contends that there is “no ‘real’ public meaning.
Public meaning is, quite explicitly, an artificial construct.”99 That “the general public
might have understood the proposed text in a particular way . . . does not mean that
any particular number of them approved of the text understood in any way.”100
Moreover, “it is hard to explain why interpreters should prefer the public meaning,
which, by hypothesis, we believe the constitution-makers did not intend.”101
Deciding the meaning of constitutional text by reference to “what the public
most likely thought” the text meant when it was enacted102 can be problematic where
much of the public was politically ignorant. In his insightful analysis of rational
voter behavior and political ignorance,103 Ilya Somin points out that original public
meaning originalism implicitly assumes a certain level of public knowledge at the
time of the ratification of constitutional provisions.104 With respect to eighteenthand nineteenth-century America, there is reason to believe that the levels of political
knowledge were not high, given barriers to the acquisition of information, low
literacy levels, and long hours of work that left people with less time to learn about
political issues.105 As the reasonable person, championed by some original public
meaning advocates, “presumably would have knowledge limitations similar to those
of actual members of the public at the time,”106 political ignorance poses a problem
98

Id.
Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional
Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 720 (2009).
100
Id. at 706–07.
101
Id. at 713.
102
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3075 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (discussing the public’s understanding of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause at the time of its enactment).
103
“Because the chance of any one vote influencing the outcome of an election is
infinitesimally small, there is little or no incentive to become knowledgeable about politics
if the only reason for doing so is to become a ‘better’ voter.” Ilya Somin, Originalism and
Political Ignorance, 97 MINN. L. REV. 625, 643 (2012) [hereinafter Somin, Originalism].
For more on this subject, see generally ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL
IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 3–4 (2013) (summarizing the extent
of political ignorance in the United States and the problems it creates).
104
See Somin, Originalism, supra note 103, at 630. The implicit assumptions are: (1)
“the public knows that the relevant constitutional provision has been enacted, or at least is
under consideration”; (2) “the public knows that the relevant provision applies to whatever
issue happens to be under consideration by the observer seeking to determine the original
meaning”; and (3) “the public must have some knowledge or understanding of how that
particular issue would be resolved under” the proposed constitutional provision. Id. at 631.
105
Id. at 643 (“At the time of ratification, some of the Founding Fathers themselves
believed that public knowledge of politics was low and worried about allowing too much
public influence over policy.”).
106
Id. at 633.
99
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for original public meaning originalism: “there may not be any clear original
meaning of a constitutional provision because a rationally ignorant electorate simply
did not know about the issue.”107
Commentators have also questioned and criticized the hypothetical reasonable
person approach to original public meaning. “Scholars invoking such imaginary
readers do not seem to be familiar with the rich scholarly literature on readerresponse literary criticism, the history of publishing and reading, or recent historical
writing on the social and cultural history of the Founding era.”108 Why should the
meaning of a constitutional provision be the meaning held by a purportedly objective
reasonable person? Who is, and how does one define, that person? Larry Alexander
makes the cogent observation that the
hypothetical person cannot be nonarbitrarily constructed: Is the person a
he or a she? Does he or she live in the city or the country? How much
education and of which kind has he or she had? How much information
does he or she possess about the law in question and the reasons behind its
promulgation, etc.?109
How those who construct a (their) reasonable person answer these questions can
affect interpretive approaches and outcomes. And “it would not be surprising if a
judicial interpreter were to hit upon a reasonable speaker who might view the
relevant language as supporting a rule that the interpreter thinks a proper constitution
ought to have.”110
D. Framework Originalism
“Is our Constitution a living document that adapts to changing circumstances,
or must we interpret it according to its original meaning?”111 Believing that this
“choice is a false one,” Jack Balkin has formulated a constitutional theory called
“framework originalism,” a “text and principle” theory of interpretation and
construction that “is both originalist and living constitutionalist.”112
“Framework . . . originalism views the Constitution as an initial [governing]
framework” within which politics begins “and must be filled out over time through
constitutional construction.”113 The theory requires judges to apply the original

107

Id. at 667.
Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas:
The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 735 (2013).
109
Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539,
541 (2013).
110
Kay, supra note 99, at 722.
111
BALKIN, supra note 41, at 3.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 21. Constitutional construction of legal text involves a two-step process. The
first step, interpretation, discerns the linguistic meaning of the text. The second step,
108
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meaning of the Constitution and assumes that judges will engage in, elaborate, and
apply constitutional constructions.114 Under this approach, “fidelity to original
public meaning entails fidelity to our abstract framework and commitments,”115 not
fidelity to the original intention or expected applications of those who drafted and
ratified constitutional provisions.116
Balkin’s text-and-principle model recognizes that
[t]he text of [the] Constitution . . . contains determinate rules (the President
must be thirty-five, there are two houses of Congress)[,] . . . standards (no
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ . . .)[,] . . . [and] principles (no
prohibitions of the free exercise of religion, no abridgements of the
freedom of speech, no denials of equal protection).117
Why those who designed the Constitution chose to use certain language demands
our attention, Balkin urges.118 Fixed rules are used to limit discretion.119 Standards
or principles are used “to channel politics through certain key concepts but delegate
the details to future generations”120 and must be applied “to our own circumstances
in our own time.”121 Balkin’s approach, which views history as a resource, differs
from what he calls conservative originalism, which views history as a command.122
***
As discussed in this Part, originalism is more accurately described and
understood as originalisms. The foci of and questions posed by originalist
interpreters of the Constitution have concentrated on the Framers, the ratifiers, the
public at the time of the adoption of a constitutional provision, hypothetical
reasonable persons, or interpreters engaging in constitutional constructions and
displaying fidelity to the Constitution’s abstract framework and commitments.
construction, “enables officials to apply the text” as courts “fashion doctrines or rules of
constitutional law.” Solum, supra note 36, at 3.
114
BALKIN, supra note 41, at 22.
115
James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1785,
1793 (2013).
116
JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST
WORLD 229–30 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION].
117
BALKIN, supra note 41, at 6.
118
Id. (“If the text [of the Constitution] states a determinate rule, we must apply the rule
because that is what the text offers us. . . . [We] should pay careful attention to the reasons
why constitutional designers choose particular kinds of language.”).
119
Id. (“Adopters use fixed rules because they want to limit discretion . . . .”)
120
Id. at 7.
121
Id. For an argument critiquing and finding doubtful Balkin’s claim that some
constitutional norms are “principles,” see Larry Alexander, The Method Of Text and ?: Jack
Balkin’s Originalism With No Regrets, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 611, 614 (2012).
122
BALKIN, supra note 41, at 229.
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The question here is whether the result in Brown v. Board of Education can be
squared with any of the foregoing originalist approaches to and accounts of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Before turning to that issue in Part III,
the next Part presents a brief overview of race, racism, the post-Civil War
Reconstruction, and the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
III. RACE, RACISM, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The issue presented in Brown v. Board of Education—whether state-mandated
racial segregation in public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment—should be situated in and requires consideration of this
nation’s history of the enslavement of Africans and their progeny, constitutional
acknowledgement and protection of the system of chattel slavery, and the failed
post-Civil War Reconstruction during which the Fourteenth Amendment was
proposed and ratified. These aspects of the country’s history of white supremacy,
racial hierarchy, and subordination of enslaved persons form the factual, contextual,
and legal background for the discussion of the political and intellectual atmosphere
preceding and culminating in the 1868 adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. The Constitution, the Color Line, and Slavery
The color line123 was an indisputable feature of the United States Constitution
of 1789, a document built on the exclusion of African Americans, which is “rightly
seen as the original sin of the United States.”124 While the original Constitution did
not explicitly use the terms “race” or “slavery,” a number of constitutional
provisions concerned those subjects.125 The Constitution expressly prohibited
congressional interference with the slave trade prior to the year 1808;126 provided
that enslaved people who escaped to a free state were to be “delivered up” and
returned to the enslavers from which they fled;127 and mandated that enslaved people
were to be counted as “three fifths of all other Persons” for purposes of determining
123

See W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 45 (David W. Blight & Robert
Gooding-Williams eds., Bedford Books 1997) (1903) (“The problem of the twentieth century
is the problem of the color-line,—the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia
and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.”).
124
MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION, supra note
41, at 10.
125
See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 4 (1987) (noting that “racial issues have riveted attention” of the country’s decision
makers).
126
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. Article V of the Constitution provided that no
amendment could be made prior to 1808 that would “in any Manner affect” Article I, Section
9. See id. art. V.
127
Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; see Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 561 (1842)
(explaining that the Constitution “declares that the fugitive shall be delivered up, on claim,
to the party to whom his service or labour may be due.”).
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representation in the United States House of Representatives and the Electoral
College and for levying taxes among the states.128
The United States thus began “in black plunder and white democracy, two
features that are not contradictory but complementary.”129 Africans were enslaved
and “plundered of their bodies, plundered of their families, and plundered of their
labor.”130 Black bodies created wealth for enslavers and for others; indeed, those
bodies were the largest financial asset in the nation’s economy.131 Black families
were sundered. An enslaved person in parts of the South “stood a 30 percent chance
of being sold in his or her lifetime. Twenty-five percent of interstate trades destroyed
a first marriage and half of them destroyed a nuclear family.”132 The enslaved were
subjected to forced migration and were whipped, tortured, and murdered by
enslavers, aggressively and viciously pursuing ever greater production by black
children, women, and men.133 Cotton “dominated US exports and the financial sector
[and] also drove the expansion of northern industry.”134 Textiles made from cotton
“employ[ed] a working class whose wages created a consumer market that
encouraged ever more dynamic market production in other areas.”135
The “peculiar institution” of this nation’s chattel, slavery,136 was justified in
part by a white-supremacist theory of congenital inferiority, which posited that
Africans and their descendants were genetically and intellectually inferior to

128

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The federal ratio enshrined in the three-fifths clause
“rewarded the southern states, artificially inflating their House seats and electoral votes and
helping to explain why four of the first five presidents hailed from Virginia.” RON CHERNOW,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 239 (2004). For more on the three-fifths clause, see GARRY WILLS,
“NEGRO PRESIDENT”: JEFFERSON AND THE SLAVE POWER 2 (2003); GORDON S. WOOD,
EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 532 (2009).
129
Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2014/05/the-case-for-reparations/361631/,
archived at http://perma.cc/Q865-BVQ7.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
See EDWARD E. BAPTIST, THE HALF HAS NEVER BEEN TOLD: SLAVERY AND THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 140–43 (2014) (describing the ways slave owners
tortured their slaves).
134
Id. at 317.
135
Id. at 318; SVEN BECKERT, EMPIRE OF COTTON: A GLOBAL HISTORY 244 (2014)
(discussing America’s ascent to dominance in the world cotton market and noting that
“[s]lavery stood at the center of the most dynamic and far-reaching production complex in
human history”); BECKERT, supra (“Cotton, and thus slavery, were indispensable to the
modern world, the very foundation of the United States’ and Europe’s astonishing material
advances.”).
136
See generally KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE
ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 197–236 (The Easton Press 1995) (1956) (relating the laws, rules, and
customs regulating slavery in the ante-bellum South).
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whites.137 This racist view can be found in the pages of the United States Reports. In
its infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford138 decision, described by one scholar as “the
original sin of originalism,”139 the Supreme Court held that Africans and their
descendants were not and could not be citizens of the United States.140 Chief Justice
Roger Brooke Taney (an owner of slaves)141 described enslaved persons as “beings
of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in
social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the
white man was bound to respect.”142 Taney declared that members of “that race”
“were not even in the minds of the framers of the Constitution when they were
conferring special rights and privileges upon the citizens of a State in every other
part of the Union.”143 “Indeed,” he opined, “when we look to the condition of this
race in the several States at the time, it is impossible to believe that these rights and
privileges were intended to be extended to them.”144
137

See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RACE AND HISTORY: SELECTED ESSAYS 1938–1988, at
325 (1989). Francis Scott Key, the author of the Star Spangled Banner, held this view.
JEFFERSON MORLEY, SNOW-STORM IN AUGUST: WASHINGTON CITY, FRANCIS SCOTT KEY,
AND THE FORGOTTEN RACE RIOT OF 1835, at 40 (2012) (“Key shared a general view of the
free people of color as shiftless and untrustworthy: a nuisance, if not a menace, to white
people. He spoke publicly of Africans in America as ‘a distinct and inferior race of people,
which all experience proves to be the greatest evil that afflicts a community.’”). See generally
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 138–43 (William Peden ed., 1954)
(setting forth Jefferson’s views on the supposed inferiority of black persons).
138
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
139
B. Jessie Hill, Resistance to Constitutional Theory: The Supreme Court,
Constitutional Change, and the “Pragmatic Moment,” 91 TEX. L. REV. 1815, 1833 (2013);
see also Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22 n.51 (2009)
(“Given the universal opprobrium that attaches to Dred Scott, it is unsurprising that
Originalists would seek to disavow it.”).
140
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404 (“The question before us is, whether [African Americans]
. . . compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We
think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under
the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and
privileges which the instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.”).
141
See JAMES F. SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY: SLAVERY, SECESSION,
AND THE PRESIDENT’S WAR POWERS 90 (2006).
142
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407.
143
Id. at 411–12.
144
Id. at 412. Chief Justice Taney also determined that the phrase “all men are created
equal” in the Declaration of Independence “would seem to embrace the whole human family,
and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day [they] would be so understood.” Id.
at 410. However, he concluded, “it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race
were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted
this declaration . . . .” Id. The “great men” “who framed this declaration . . . perfectly
understood the meaning of the language they used, and how it would be understood by
others; and they knew that it would not in any part of the civilized world be supposed to
embrace the negro race . . . .” Id.
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B. Reconstruction, the Black Codes, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866
During the post-Civil War Reconstruction,145 much of which “was a failure in
its time,”146 slavery was formally banned in 1865 by the Thirteenth Amendment to
the Constitution.147 Three and one half million enslaved persons were freed, joining
approximately half a million individuals who escaped slavery during the Civil
War.148
Emancipation was met by a vigorous and violent backlash in the former states
of the Confederacy.149 As noted by William A. Sinclair, an individual who was
enslaved at birth, “the white people of the South . . . regarded the freeing of the
colored man as a wrong to the white man.”150 Efforts by Radical Republicans to
reconstruct the nation were resisted by redeemers, “White Liners, Red Shirts, and
Klansmen bent on upholding a society formed for the white, not for the black
man.”151 The Ku Klux Klan, a paramilitary outfit founded at the beginning of
Reconstruction by Confederate veterans, commenced a campaign of harassment,
intimidation, and murder.152 This form of new slavery was imposed and pursued via
Black Codes,153 returning freedpersons to “a condition as close to their former one

145

See An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States
(Military Reconstruction Act), ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867). This legislation divided the
South into five military districts, and provided that military rule would end and readmission
of the Confederate states into the United States would be permitted when those states
established new governments and new state constitutions, ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment, and granted African Americans the right to vote. Id. §§ 1, 5, 14 Stat. at 428–
29.
146
Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 997
(2012); see also DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, THE WARS OF RECONSTRUCTION: THE BRIEF,
VIOLENT HISTORY OF AMERICA’S MOST PROGRESSIVE ERA 19 (2014) (arguing that
Reconstruction “did not fail” but “was violently overthrown”).
147
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
148
JIM DOWNS, SICK FROM FREEDOM: AFRICAN-AMERICAN ILLNESS AND SUFFERING
DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 21 (2012).
149
See WILLIAM A. SINCLAIR, THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY: A STUDY OF THE
CONDITION AND ENVIRONMENT OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO 3 (Afro-Am Press 1969) (1905).
150
Id.
151
Coates, supra note 129 (internal quotation marks omitted).
152
See STEVEN HAHN, A NATION UNDER OUR FEET: BLACK POLITICAL STRUGGLES IN
THE RURAL SOUTH FROM SLAVERY TO THE GREAT MIGRATION 27580 (2003) (discussing an
investigation of the paramilitary politics of the Ku Klux Klan).
153
As described by the United States Supreme Court, Black Codes “imposed upon the
colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life,
liberty, and property to such an extent that their freedom was of little value . . . .” SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1872).
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as it was possible to get without actually reinstituting slavery.”154 In a 1907 book,
Columbia University history professor William Archibald Dunning155 described the
codes as
a conscientious and straightforward attempt to bring some sort of order out
of the social and economic chaos which a full acceptance of the results of
war and emancipation involved . . . . The freedmen were not, and in the
nature of the case could not for generations be, on the same social, moral,
and intellectual plane with the whites; and this fact was recognized by
constituting them a separate class in the civil order.156
Responding to the Black Codes,157 the United States Congress, over the veto of
“fervent Negrophobe” President Andrew Johnson,158 passed the Civil Rights Act of
1866. That legislation provided, in pertinent part:
[A]ll persons born in the United States . . . are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States; and such citizens . . . shall have the same
154

NICHOLAS LEMANN, REDEMPTION: THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL WAR 34 (2006);
see also SINCLAIR, supra note 149, at 74 (Southerners used the Black Codes “to suppress the
colored man” and “make his condition worse under emancipation than it was under slavery
. . . .”).
Post-slavery Black Codes were not the first such codes in the history of the United
States, as several post-Revolutionary northern states enacted codes denying fundamental
rights to black persons and limiting their opportunities to obtain work. See JACQUELINE
JONES, A DREADFUL DECEIT: THE MYTH OF RACE FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO OBAMA’S
AMERICA 101 (2013).
155
The “Dunning school of Reconstruction historiography” assumed “negro
incapacity” and “portrayed African Americans either as ‘children,’ ignorant dupes
manipulated by unscrupulous whites, or as savages, their primal passions unleashed by the
end of slavery.” ERIC FONER, FOREVER FREE: THE STORY OF EMANCIPATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION, at xxii (2005). John W. Burgess, a leading Dunning school figure and “a
founder of American political science, taught that ‘a black skin means membership in a race
of men which has never of itself succeeded in subjecting passion to reason, and has never,
therefore, created any civilization of any kind.’” Id.; see also Greene, supra note 146, at 1006
(“Through the middle of the twentieth century, the dominant narrative of Reconstruction was
supplied by denizens of the Dunning School . . . .”).
156
WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
1865–1877, at 58 (1907).
157
See BERGER, supra note 50, at 34 (the 1866 Civil Rights Bill was “a studied response
to a perceived evil, the Black Codes, which the Republicans averred were designed to set
emancipation at naught, to restore the shackles of the prior Slave Codes, and to return the
blacks to serfdom.” (citation omitted)); see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 18631877, at 243–45, 454–59 (1988) (outlining Congress’s
response to the Black Codes).
158
RANDALL KENNEDY, THE PERSISTENCE OF THE COLOR LINE: RACIAL POLITICS AND
THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY 42 (2011); accord Annette Gordon-Reed, ANDREW JOHNSON 112,
124 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Sean Wilentz eds., 2011).
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right . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other,
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding.159
As the Supreme Court noted in 1883, in enacting the 1866 Civil Rights Act,
Congress
did not assume, under the authority given [to it] by the Thirteenth
Amendment, to adjust what may be called the social rights of men and
races in the community; but only to declare and vindicate those
fundamental rights which appertain to the essence of citizenship, and the
enjoyment or deprivation of which constitutes the essential distinction
between freedom and slavery.160
C. The Fourteenth Amendment
Thereafter, and seeking to constitutionalize the 1866 legislation, a “partial,
‘rump’ Congressdevoid of Southern representation—. . . proposed the Fourteenth
Amendment”161 to the Constitution.162 As Confederate states’ readmission to the
United States was conditioned on their ratification of the amendment,163 it has been

159
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982).
160
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883) (emphasis added).
161
Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
107 NW. U. L. REV. 1627, 1643 (2013).
162
See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 386 (1880) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment . .
. secure[s] to the colored race, thereby invested with the rights, privileges, and
responsibilities of citizenship, the enjoyment of all the civil rights that, under the law, are
enjoyed by white persons . . . .”); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A
BIOGRAPHY 381 (2005) (In proposing the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress “aimed to
provide an unimpeachable legal foundation” for the 1866 Civil Rights Act.); AKHIL REED
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 187 (1998) (ebook) (Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment “was consciously designed and widely understood to
embrace” the Civil Rights Act of 1866); BERGER, supra note 50, at 32–33 (The Fourteenth
Amendment “was designed to ‘constitutionalize’ the [1866 Civil Rights] Act . . . .”); John
Harrison, Time, Change, and the Constitution, 90 VA. L. REV. 1601, 1606 (2004) (“The
primary point of Section 1 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] was to constitutionalize a
statutory ban on race discrimination, the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”).
163
See supra note 145 and accompanying text. On the issue of the states’ ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, see also GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON:
JOHN BINGHAM AND THE INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 129–31 (2013)
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remarked that the amendment was “forced down the throat of the southern political
establishment”164 and “was ratified not by the collective assent of the American
people, but rather at gunpoint.”165
Officially adopted in 1868, Section 1 of the amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.166
As can be seen, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment does not expressly prohibit
racial classifications; a proposal to do so was made during the drafting process but
was rejected.167 “Indeed, some Radical Republicans opposed ratification because
they thought the amendment’s limited reach rendered it a party trick designed only
for electioneering purposes.”168 Some Southerners “referred to the Fourteenth
Amendment as the ‘negro equalization amendment,’ and were ‘terrified’ that it
would . . . someday be interpreted to preclude laws banning interracial marriage,”
while compelling whites “to live on a level with the sickening stench of degraded
humanity.”169
What conduct was forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment? Three separate
and distinct categories of rights were generally recognized in the Reconstruction era.
Civil rights included “freedom of contract, property ownership, and court access—
rights guaranteed in the 1866 Civil Rights Act, for which the Fourteenth Amendment

(commenting on Congress’s possible response to the states’ refusal to ratify the Fourteenth
Amendment).
164
Greene, supra note 146, at 1009.
165
Colby, supra note 161, at 1629; see also WILLIAM D. WORKMAN, JR., THE CASE FOR
THE SOUTH 14 (1960) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was “adopted in . . . an
uncivil, unrighteous and manifestly unconstitutional manner.”).
166
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
167
The Congressional Joint Committee on Reconstruction considered but did not adopt
the following language: “No discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United
States, as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.” MAGLIOCCA, supra note 163, at 121 (quoting BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE
JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 296 (1914)). The
Committee’s draft was not acceptable to Republicans who were “leery of seeming too
attached to black interests” and “probably wanted to protect white unionists in the South
from oppression by reconstructed state governments controlled by ex-Confederates.”
Harrison, supra note 162, at 1606–07.
168
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 18 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
169
Colby, supra note 161, at 1647 (citations omitted).
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was designed to provide a secure constitutional foundation.”170 “All adult members
of the political community possessed civil equality; that is what black males
obtained when they became free.”171 “[P]olitical rights, such as voting or jury
service,” were not enjoyed by all persons.172 “[P]eople could be civilly equal but not
politically equal. Black men and unmarried women were civilly equal to white men
but not politically equal.”173 Racial discrimination in voting was prohibited in the
Fifteenth Amendment, two years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.174
“[S]ocial rights, such as interracial marriage or school integration,” were
resisted by many, including by Republicans.175 The concept of social equality had
“a racially charged meaning” and was considered a “code word for miscegenation
and racial intermarriage. The idea (or rather the fear) was that the relative status of
blacks and whites as a group would be altered if society had a preponderance of
mixed-race children, or if blacks and whites regarded themselves as members of the
same family.”176 Thus, as Rebecca Scott observed, “[t]o conflate the phrase ‘social
equality’ with an imagined taxonomy of civil, political, and social rights is to
mistake an insult for an analytic exercise.”177 Social equality was “a label . . .
enemies had long attempted to pin on the proponents of equal public rights in order
to associate public rights with private intimacy and thereby to trigger the host of
fears connected with the image of black men in physical proximity to white
women.”178 With respect to public school education, African Americans “were
almost universally excluded from, or segregated in, public schools when the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.”179 The subject of infrequent discussion
170

KLARMAN, supra note 168, at 19; see also McConnell, supra note 14, at 961 n.48
(noting an 1872 speech by Senator Lyman Trumbull in which Trumbull stated that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 was confined to civil rights and did not apply to political or social rights).
171
BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 116, at 144.
172
KLARMAN, supra note 168, at 19.
173
BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 116, at 144.
174
See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
175
KLARMAN, supra note 168, at 19; see also Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998
SUP. CT. REV. 303, 325 [hereinafter Klarman, The Plessy Era] (“Many northern Republicans
in 1866 continued to resist the extension to blacks of either equal political rights, such as
voting or jury service, or social rights, such as interracial marriage or school integration.”);
Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1898 (1995) [hereinafter Klarman, Brown,
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory] (Section 1 of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment
“was consistently defended in public debate—both in Congress and in the constituencies—
as a guarantee of civil, not political or social, rights.”).
176
BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 116, at 145 (citation omitted).
177
Rebecca J. Scott, Public Rights, Social Equality, and the Conceptual Roots of the
Plessy Challenge, 106 MICH. L. REV. 777, 781 (2008).
178
Id.; see also McConnell, supra note 14, at 1018 (“A significant undercurrent in the
discussion of social rights was the fear that intermixing would lead to miscegenation, and
that the theory of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . would logically extend to a right of racial
intermarriage.”).
179
KLARMAN, supra note 168, at 19.
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during the 1866 debates over the amendment, Democrats argued and Republicans
denied that the provision would protect a social right to compulsory school
integration.180 In sum, Reconstruction-era legal thought did not envisage
governmental guarantee of social rights.181
The Reconstruction-era taxonomy of rights is recognized in Jack Balkin’s
“tripartite theory of citizenship.”182 He notes that “the key point of the tripartite
theory was that equal citizenship and equality before the law meant something less
than it does for us today: civil equality, but not political or social equality.”183 This
understanding of the rights protected and not protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment is consistent with the fact that at the time of the amendment’s adoption,
the Framers and ratifiers (including a number of Republicans) “did not want to give
blacks the right to vote and . . . did not want to challenge state laws banning
interracial marriage; to do so in 1866 would have been politically explosive.”184
Further evidence and confirmation of the existence and recognition of the civilpolitical-social-rights trichotomy is found in Plessy v. Ferguson.185 As one of the
180

Id.
See Mark Tushnet, Contemporary Issues of Race Relations, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 699,
700–01 (1993); see also GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY:
THE CONSTITUTION, COMMON LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866, at 11 (2013)
(“Consistent with the understanding of civil rights at the time, the act stopped well short of
protecting full participation in public life. It did not protect political rights, such as the right
to vote, or social rights, such as the right to marry.” (citation omitted)); Eric Foner, The
Original Intent of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Conversation with Eric Foner, 6 NEV. L.J.
425, 438 (2006) (“Nobody who was talking about the Fourteenth Amendment except Charles
Sumner believed in social equality. Social equality tended to mean intermarriage between
black and white. . . . Social equality was for individuals; the state could not mandate.”);
Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 291 (1998)
(“Through most of Reconstruction and the years that followed, it was generally understood
that blacks were constitutionally entitled to the same civil rights as whites but not necessarily
to the same social and political rights.”); Stephen M. Rich, Against Prejudice, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 29 (2011) (during the Reconstruction era “courts assessed the
constitutionality of antidiscrimination laws by determining whether such laws conferred
civil, political, and social rights.”); Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
791, 792 (1996) (“The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment said repeatedly that the
Amendment was intended to protect civil rights, but not political or social rights.”); Mark
Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future of the Reconstruction Amendments, 25
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1207, 1208–09 (1992) (the Fourteenth Amendment protected civil but not
social rights).
182
BALKIN, supra note 41, at 222.
183
Id. at 222–23; see also McConnell, supra note 14, at 1016 (“The ‘social rights’
argument was based on a tripartite division of rights, universally accepted at the time but
forgotten today, between civil rights, political rights, and social rights.”); id. at 1024 (“It was
generally understood that the nondiscrimination requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment
applied only to ‘civil rights.’ Political and social rights, it was agreed, were not civil rights
and were not protected.”).
184
BALKIN, supra note 41, at 223.
185
163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
181
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cases in the American anti-canon,186 Plessy rejected an equal protection challenge to
Louisiana’s Separate Car Law mandating “equal but separate accommodations for
the white, and the colored races.”187 Speaking for the Court, Justice Henry Billings
Brown determined that the law was a reasonable regulation, with the “question of
reasonableness” answered by the state’s “liberty to act with reference to the
established usages, customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to the
promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good
order.”188
Of special interest is the Court’s construction of the Equal Protection Clause.
In Justice Brown’s view, the mandate that the state shall not deny to any person the
equal protection of the laws was not “intended to abolish distinctions based upon
color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political[,] equality, or a
commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.”189 Laws
mandating the separation of blacks and whites did “not necessarily imply the
inferiority of either race to the other,” and “the establishment of separate schools for
white and colored children . . . has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative
power even by courts of States where the political rights of the colored race have
been longest and most earnestly enforced.”190 And “[l]aws forbidding the
intermarriage of the two races may be said in a technical sense to interfere with the
freedom to contract, and yet have been universally recognized as within the police
power of the State.”191
In addition, Justice Brown found flawed the assumption that social prejudices
can be overcome by legislation: “If the two races are to meet upon terms of social
equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each
other’s merits and a voluntary consent of individuals.”192 Expressly distinguishing
between civil, political, and social rights, he concluded: “If the civil and political
rights of both races be equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically.
If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States
cannot put them upon the same plane.”193
The sole dissenter in Plessy, Justice John Marshall Harlan, opined, “[e]very one
knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to
exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored
people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons.”194 The “real
meaning” of the at-issue law was to ensure that “inferior and degraded” African

186

See Akhil Reed Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson and the Anti-Canon, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 75,
76 (2011); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (2011).
187
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540 (quoting 1890 La. Acts 152).
188
Id. at 550.
189
Id. at 544 (emphasis added).
190
Id.
191
Id. at 545.
192
Id. at 551 (emphasis added).
193
Id. at 551–52 (emphasis added).
194
Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Americans could not sit in public coaches with whites.195 Justice Harlan viewed the
railway car segregation mandated by the Separate Car Law as the denial of a civil
right and “a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the
equality before the law established by the Constitution. It cannot be justified upon
any legal grounds.”196
Notably, Justice Harlan (who had owned slaves and opposed the Emancipation
Proclamation, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Freedmen’s Bureau)197 did not
endorse or argue for the protection of African Americans’ social equality:
[S]ocial equality no more exists between two races when travelling in a
passenger coach or a public highway than when members of the same
races sit by each other in a street car or in the jury box, or stand or sit with
each other in a political assembly, or when they use in common the streets
of a city or town, or when they are in the same room for the purpose of
having their names placed on the registry of voters, or when they approach
the ballot-box in order to exercise the high privilege of voting.198
Justice Harlan’s dissent also set forth his metaphoric conception of the Constitution.
In a passage preceded by language endorsing the racial superiority of whites,199 he
stated: “[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country
no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens.”200 That he was referring only to civil rights was made clear:
In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest
is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes
no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.201
To reiterate, Justice Harlan’s equal protection analysis reflects the reality that
at the time of its adoption, it was understood that the Fourteenth Amendment
195

Id. at 560.
Id. at 562.
197
See Ronald Turner, A Critique of Justice Antonin Scalia’s Originalist Defense of
Brown v. Board of Education, 62 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 170, 183 (2014).
198
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 561 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
199
Justice Harlan made clear his view that “[t]he white race deems itself to be the
dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in
wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to
its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.” Id. at 559. Justice
Harlan thus recognized and endorsed “white superiority in the very paragraph in which he
proclaimed fealty to colorblindness.” Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race,
Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 993 (2007).
200
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
201
Id. (emphasis added).
196
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protected civil but not social rights.202 This understanding of the protective scope of
the clause is also evidenced by the Court’s pre-Plessy decision in Pace v.
Alabama.203 In Pace, Justice Harlan joined the Court’s decision and holding that a
state criminal law’s penalty enhancement for adultery and fornication engaged in by
black-white couples did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.204 The Court
reasoned that punishing different-race couples more harshly than same-race couples
engaging in the same conduct did not violate the clause because the more severe
punishment was “directed against the offence designated and not against the person
of any particular color or race. The punishment of each offending person, whether
white or black, is the same.”205 Pace thus preserved “[c]ivil equality . . . because
members of each race were subject to the same punishments if they slept with
persons of a different race, and securing social equality was not a proper concern of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”206 Moreover, in cases decided after Plessy, Justice
Harlan joined the Court’s ruling upholding a racially discriminatory poll tax207 and
wrote the Court’s opinion rejecting an equal protection challenge to a separate-butunequal scheme involving a school board’s closing of an all-black high school and
continued operation of a high school for whites.208
***
The foregoing and necessarily brief discussion of certain aspects of this
nation’s history of white supremacy and racial hierarchy is presented to provide a
factual and legal backdrop and context relevant to the consideration of the political
and intellectual atmosphere and beliefs, attitudes, and prejudices extant at the time
of the proposed and ratified Fourteenth Amendment. That exercise requires
reference to and recognition of mid-nineteenth century facts and racial/racist
realities. An informed and unflinching recognition of American apartheid’s racist
regime and the subordinating practices of that time is essential to an accurate
reporting of life in that deeply racist era. “For the intellectual elite of the late
nineteenth century,” racism was “a feature of reality. . . . Racism constituted how
people saw the world—how normal people saw the world. To deny or question
racism didn’t make you curious, or clever. To deny it made you weird.”209
202
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public
Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1211–12 (2014) (In Plessy, “Justice Harlan’s
dissent agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment did not reach inequalities in social rights. His
disagreement with the Court rested on his conclusion that railroad segregation implicated
civil, rather than social, equality.” (citation omitted)).
203
106 U.S. 583 (1882), overruled by McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
204
Id. at 584–85; see Turner, supra note 197, at 182.
205
Pace, 106 U.S. at 585.
206
BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 116, at 145.
207
See Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898).
208
See Cumming v. Richmond Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899);
KLARMAN, supra note 168, at 45.
209
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1421 (1997).
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Was that world one in which the Fourteenth Amendment recognized and
protected black children’s social right to a desegregated public school education?
IV. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
Was state-mandated racial segregation in public schools prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment? This Part examines Brown v. Board of Education, a case
about the social right to education,210 and the Supreme Court’s 1954 invalidation of
state-mandated racial segregation in public schools. In addition, post-Brown actions
by supporters of the segregationist status quo are considered, including originalist
arguments made by United States Senators and Representatives in their “Southern
Manifesto” opposing the Court’s decision.
A. The Segregationist and Originalist Defense
In December 1952, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the Segregation
Cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware wherein the lower
courts rejected Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state-mandated racial
segregation in public schools.211 John W. Davis, counsel for the school board in the
South Carolina case, addressed “the condition of those who framed” the Fourteenth
Amendment.212 He noted that “the same Congress” that proposed the amendment in
June 1866 proceeded in July 1866 “to establish or to continue separate schools in
the District of Columbia.”213 Turning to the states, Davis advised the Court that thirty
of the thirty-seven states of the union ratified the Fourteenth Amendment; of those
ratifying states, twenty-three had or immediately installed racially segregated public
schools.214 “Were they violating the Amendment which they had solemnly
accepted?,” Davis asked the Court.215 “Were they conceiving of it in any other sense
than that it did not touch their power over their public schools?”216
In the Court’s post-argument conference, Chief Justice Fred Moore Vinson
expressed his view that “the Plessy case was right . . . .”217 Justice William O.
210

See Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA.
L. REV. 1537, 1570 (2004).
211
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486 n.1 (1954).
212
Oral Argument, Briggs v. Elliott, 342 U.S. 350 (1952), rev’d sub nom. Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 331 (Philip B. Kurland &
Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS].
213
Id.
214
See id. at 333.
215
Id.
216
Id. Davis argued that as of 1952 seventeen states provided for racially segregated
schools and that four states permitted school boards to segregate black and white students.
Id.
217
MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961, at 187 (1994).
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Douglas believed that “if the cases were to be then decided the vote would be five
to four in favor of the constitutionality of segregation in the public schools in the
States . . . .”218 When Justice Felix Frankfurter persuaded his colleagues that the
cases should be reargued the following Term, the Court ordered reargument and
asked the parties to address several questions, including this query: “What evidence
is there that the Congress which submitted and the State legislatures and conventions
which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated or did not contemplate,
understood or did not understand, that it would abolish segregation in public
schools?”219
Appearing at the December 1953 reargument,220 John W. Davis addressed the
Court’s question regarding congressional and ratifiers’ understandings as to whether
the Fourteenth Amendment would abolish racially segregated schools.221 Davis
reiterated the count-the-states argument he made to the Court a year earlier222 and
contended that a study of legislation by Congress before, after, and during the time
period in which the amendment was discussed made clear that “Congress did not
intend by the Fourteenth Amendment to deal with the question of mixed or
segregated schools.”223 Moreover, Davis continued, the Freedmen’s Bureau
established by the same Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment
established racially separate schools throughout the South.224 He argued, in addition,
that during the House of Representatives’ consideration of the bill that would
become the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the complaint was made that the legislation
“would do away with the separate schools.”225 Responding to that assertion,
Representative James Wilson, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, “said
on the floor that the Act did not mean that their children should attend the same
school, and, in effect, that it was absurd so to interpret it.”226

218

Id.; see THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985): THE PRIVATE
DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 661 (Del Dickson ed.,
2001).
219
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972, 972 (1953) (per curiam).
220
Prior to the reargument, Chief Justice Vinson suffered a fatal heart attack and was
replaced on the Court by Earl Warren. See JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN
AND THE NATION HE MADE 256 (2006). Upon learning of Chief Justice Vinson’s death,
Justice Frankfurter reportedly said, “This is the first indication that I have ever had that there
is a God.” BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—
A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 72 (1983).
221
49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 212, at 479, 481.
222
Id. at 481.
223
Id. at 482.
224
Id. at 484.
225
Id. at 485.
226
Id.
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B. The Court’s Decision
On May 17, 1954, a unanimous Court issued its nonoriginalist, if not
antioriginalist, decision.227 Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren noted
that the 1953 reargument “was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868,” and “covered exhaustively
consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing
practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the
Amendment.”228 While “these sources cast some light,” the Chief Justice stated, “it
is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are
inconclusive.”229 This conclusion is certainly questionable. “It was unclear, to say
the least, that the framers or ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment had intended the
equal protection clause to prevent racially segregated public [school] education.”230
Alexander Bickel, one of Justice Frankfurter’s law clerks, published an article in
1955 in which he concluded that “the immediate objectives to which section I of the
fourteenth amendment was addressed . . . was not expected in 1866 to apply to
segregation.”231
227
See CROSS, supra note 13, at 92 (asserting that “Brown [is] functionally an
antioriginalist opinion.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 198 (2013)
(concluding that Brown is a nonoriginalist decision).
228
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
229
Id. Chief Justice Warren opined that the proponents of the post-Civil War
amendments “intended them to remove all legal distinctions among ‘all persons born or
naturalized in the United States,’” while opponents “were antagonistic to both the letter and
the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited [legal] effect. What
others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any
degree of certainty.” Id. In addition, he determined that at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment the free public school movement “had not yet taken hold” and that
education of black persons “was almost nonexistent” and was “forbidden by law in some
states.” Id. at 490. Given that record, he was not surprised that there was “little in the history
of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.” Id.
230
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 62 (1995).
231
Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 64 (1955); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 100 (1962) (“Was it the intention
of the framers of that Amendment—the Reconstruction 39th Congress—to forbid the states
to enact and enforce segregation statutes? . . . The framers did not intend or expect then and
there to outlaw segregation, which, of course, was a practice widely prevalent in the North.”);
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 156 (1999) (“[T]he
very Congress that submitted the Fourteenth Amendment to the states for ratification also
supported segregated schools in the District of Columbia” and the Amendment’s supporters
gave assurances that the Amendment would not require racially integrated schools.); Michael
Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 252
(1991) (“Evidence regarding the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is
ambiguous as to a wide variety of issues, but not school segregation. Virtually nothing in the
congressional debates suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prohibit
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Looking to the Court’s initial Fourteenth Amendment decisions, Chief Justice
Warren observed that the Court interpreted the amendment “as proscribing all stateimposed discriminations against the Negro race,”232 and that the separate-but-equal
doctrine did not appear in the Court until the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson decision
involving racial segregation in public transportation.233 The Chief Justice opined that
“we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even
to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.”234 Focusing instead on “public
education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life
throughout the Nation,”235 he formulated a then-present-day approach to the issue
before the Court:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally
to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of
an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.236
Chief Justice Warren then asked and answered in the affirmative the question
of whether segregating children by race deprived children of color of equal
educational opportunities, even though physical facilities and other tangible factors
were “equal.”237 Noting that the Court had considered intangible considerations in
invalidating segregated education in the professional school setting,238 he
determined that:
school segregation, while contemporaneous state practices render such an interpretation
fanciful . . . .” (citation omitted)).
232
Brown, 347 U.S. at 490, 490 n.5 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)).
233
See id. at 490–91.
234
Id. at 492.
235
Id. at 492−93.
236
Id. at 493.
237
Id.
238
See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641–42
(1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634–37 (1950); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ.
of Okla., 332 U.S. 631, 632–33 (1948) (per curiam). David Strauss argues that in relying on
these higher education cases the Brown Court completed an evolutionary “common law
process.” STRAUSS, supra note 19, at 92.
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Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high
schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone.239
“Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of
Plessy v. Ferguson,” the finding that racial segregation in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon children of color “is amply supported by modern authority.
Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.”240
Having rejected certain language in but not expressly overruling Plessy,241
Chief Justice Warren declared “that in the field of public education the doctrine of
‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal.”242 Accordingly, the plaintiffs and other similarly situated persons had been
“deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”243
C. Post-Brown Developments
Supporters of the pre-Brown segregationist status quo responded to Brown. In
March 1956, virtually all United States Senators and Representatives from southern
states issued a “Declaration of Constitutional Principles,” also known as the
“Southern Manifesto.”244 Drafted by Senators Strom Thurmond, Sam Ervin, Harry
Byrd, Richard Russell and others,245 the manifesto proclaimed that the Founding
Fathers “framed this Constitution with its provisions for change by amendment in
239

Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
Id. at 494−95 (citation omitted). Footnote 11 to the “modern authority” text of the
Court’s opinion cited social science studies, including Dr. Kenneth Clark’s doll test. See id.
at 494 n.11. For more on footnote 11, see ROY L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION?
A STRATEGY FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 13−15 (1996); Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of
Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 279, 292−96 (2005).
241
David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J 1065,
1070 (2008) (“Brown did not formally overrule Plessy, [but] it squarely . . . [addressed] the
claim, central to Plessy, that segregation did not necessarily denote inferiority.”). Segregated
public transportation was subsequently held unconstitutional in Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S.
903, 903 (1956) (mem.) (per curiam), aff’g 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956).
242
Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
243
Id.
244
See 102 CONG. REC. 4459–61 (1956) (statement of Sen. George); id. at 5445
(statement of Sen. Thurmond). Only three southern senators—Albert Gore and Estes
Kefauver of Tennessee and Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas—did not sign the manifesto. Justin
Driver, Supremacies and the Southern Manifesto, 92 TEX. L. REV 1053, 1079 (2014).
245
See KARL E. CAMPBELL, SENATOR SAM ERVIN, LAST OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS
105−07 (2007); ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE
SENATE 785 (2002).
240
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order to secure the fundamentals of government against the dangers of temporary
popular passion or the personal predilections of public officeholders.”246 The
manifesto regarded Brown as “a clear abuse of judicial power” and the culmination
of a trend of federal court legislation “in derogation of the authority of Congress”
that “encroach[ed] upon the reserved rights of the States and the people.”247 This
“unwarranted decision of the Supreme Court in the public school cases is now
bearing the fruit always produced when men substitute naked power for established
law.”248
Consider the manifesto’s originalist critique of Brown:
The original Constitution does not mention education. Neither does the
14th amendment nor any other amendment. The debates preceding the
submission of the 14th amendment clearly show that there was no intent
that it should affect the system of education maintained by the States.
The very Congress which proposed the amendment subsequently
provided for segregated schools in the District of Columbia.
When the amendment was adopted in 1868, there were 37 States of
the Union. Every one of the 26 states that had any substantial racial
differences among its people . . . either approved the operation of
segregated schools already in existence or subsequently established such
schools by action of the same law-making body which considered the 14th
amendment.249
The manifesto also approvingly referred to Plessy v. Ferguson, stating that the
Court’s validation of the separate-but-equal doctrine
became a part of the life of the people of many of the States and confirmed
their habits, customs, traditions, and way of life. It is founded on elemental
humanity and commonsense, for parents should not be deprived by
Government of the right to direct the lives and education of their own
children.250
The manifesto’s critique of Brown “placed in the foreground precisely the
argument that the Court’s opinion . . . sought to force into the background.”251 For
the manifesto’s authors, the states’ power to segregate children on the basis of race
was consistent with the original and established law of the Fourteenth
Amendment.252 Brown’s “naked power” grab did what the manifesto authors would
246

102 CONG. REC. 4460 (1956).
Id.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
Driver, supra note 244, at 1063.
252
Id. (“The Manifesto’s central critique asserted that the decision violated the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
247
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not have done: formally interred a significant component and manifestation of Jim
and Jane Crow’s white-supremacist racial hierarchy and subordination.
Other opponents of Brown turned to state legislatures in Alabama, Georgia,
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia and obtained declarations that the Court’s
decision was null and void.253 The employment of Georgia state officers who refused
to enforce that state’s segregation laws could be terminated.254 Virginia announced
that it would employ “all ‘honorabl[e], legal[ ] and constitutional[ ]’ means to ‘resist
this illegal encroachment upon our sovereign powers.’”255
Individuals seeking to integrate public schools experienced resistance. For
instance, in 1957, the Arkansas National Guard carried out the orders of Governor
Orval Faubus and prevented the enrollment of nine African American students at the
Little Rock Central High School.256 Although he sympathized with Southerners
concerned that their “sweet little girls [would] be seated alongside some big
overgrown Negroes,”257 President Dwight D. Eisenhower dispatched one thousand
soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division to Little Rock to restore order and allow
the students to enroll.258 In 1960, federal marshals escorted six-year-old Ruby
Bridges past an egg- and tomato-throwing crowd and into the William Frantz
Elementary School in New Orleans, Louisiana (an event depicted in Norman
Rockwell’s famous “The Problem We All Live With” painting).259 She was the first
African American student to racially integrate a New Orleans school.260
***
As set forth in this Part, an originalist argument in defense of the separate-butequal doctrine in the context of public education was in fact made to the Supreme
Court in the Brown argument and reargument. Deciding the case on the basis of its
view of the role and dynamics of public education circa 1954, the Court did not look
to the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment or to Plessy’s latenineteenth-century validation of Louisiana’s apartheidic separation and
subordination of African Americans. Stridently opposed by those favoring the
253

Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetoric of Moderation: Desegregating the South During
the Decade After Brown, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 92, 93 (1994); Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther
King’s Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999,
1014 n.93 (1989).
254
See Kennedy, supra note 253, at 1014.
255
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 60 (2000)
(quoting S.J. Res. 3, 1956 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 1956 Va. Acts 1213, 1215).
256
See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954–
63, at 222 (1988).
257
EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN 291 (1977)
(quoting Eisenhower).
258
BRANCH, supra note 256, at 224.
259
See DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA, NEW
ORLEANS, AND THE MISSISSIPPI GULF COAST 257 (2006).
260
Id.
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segregationist status quo and pressing an originalist critique of its decision, the
Court’s nonoriginalist, if not antioriginalist, decision holds an exalted place in the
nation’s constitutional law canon.
V. DISCRETIONARY ORIGINALISM AND BROWN
Can Brown be squared with originalism? Over the years, originalist scholars
asking this question have engaged in one or more aspects of discretionary
originalism. They have chosen originalism over other available methodologies;
selected a particular originalist methodology from among a menu of originalist
theories; framed the inquiry and defined the level of generality at which the claimed
right to a desegregated public school education should be characterized; and
determined the parameters of the evidentiary inquiry relevant to the issue addressed
in Brown. While a few originalists have concluded that Brown was wrongly decided,
more advocates of the methodology have reached the opposite conclusion. In doing
so, they employed varying conceptions and theories of originalism and made
discretionary interpretive and analytical moves en route to their determination that
the result in Brown can be squared with originalism. That discretionary originalism
is discussed in this Part.
A. Original-Intent Originalism
In Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Raoul Berger examined the “sacred cow of modern constitutional law,
Brown v. Board of Education.”261 Berger believed that Brown was “a long overdue
attempt to rectify the grievous wrongs done to the blacks.”262 He did not believe,
however, that the Fourteenth Amendment authorized the Supreme Court to outlaw
racial segregation in public schools.263
Berger noted that “Congress . . . permitted segregated schools in the District of
Columbia from 1864 onward” and had refused to abolish such schools.264 “How can
it be maintained that Congress, after steadfastly refusing to abolish segregated
schools in the District, . . . would cram desegregation down the throats of the
States?”265 Black students, “still widely regarded as ‘racially inferior’ and ‘incapable
of education,’” could not attend public schools in the North, Berger stated.266 And a
proposal to ban segregated schools in the North “was far from the framers’ minds,”
for “such interference with state control of internal affairs would have imperiled

261

BERGER, supra note 50, at 25.
Id. at 132.
263
See infra notes 264–272.
264
BERGER, supra note 50, at 26 (quoting RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 635
(1976)).
265
Id.
266
Id. (quoting HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN’S CONSTITUTION 290 n.70 (1968));
see also id. at 152 (“Segregated schools were deeply entrenched in the North.”).
262
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enactment and adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.”267 In fact, Berger observed,
House Judiciary Committee Chairman James Wilson gave his “assurance that the
parallel Civil Rights Bill—regarded as ‘identical’ with the Fourteenth Amendment
. . .—did not require” desegregated schools.268
Berger found additional evidence that the Framers did not intend to prohibit
school segregation in the fact that at the time of the proposal of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Senate gallery was segregated,269 and a post-amendment-adoption
effort by Charles Sumner to move a supplemental bill requiring a provision for
nondiscriminatory public schools in state constitutions failed.270 Accordingly, “the
‘imperfect’ ‘understanding of equal protection’ in 1866 means that the framers did
not conceive it in the vastly broadened terms given to the phrase by the Warren
Court.”271 It was not necessary to refer to such segregation in the amendment’s text
“because confessedly no one then imagined that the equal protection clause might
affect school segregation. Why provide against the unimagined?”272 On Berger’s
view and application of original intent originalism, Brown was wrongly decided.
Another scholar, Earl Maltz, has argued that the originalist case against Brown
is grounded in the view that “a direct constitutional attack on segregated schools was
unthinkable in the period in which the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, passed,
and ratified.”273 Maltz observed that school segregation was common in the northern
states and was prevalent in the lower northern states during the time in which the
amendment was considered.274 “Thus, any direct, broad-based effort to attack
segregated schools would have carried with it substantial political risks.”275 The
Fourteenth Amendment was crafted to appeal to swing voters, and mainstream
Republicans assured voters that the amendment’s impact on the laws of northern
states would be minimal, “a claim they could not make if Section 1 had been
generally understood to outlaw segregated schools.”276 Like Berger, Maltz
determined that congressional unwillingness to abolish segregated schools in the
District of Columbia suggested that the Framers did not intend to prohibit
segregation in the public schools.277
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Id. at 26.
Id. at 26−27.
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Id. at 139.
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Id. at 140.
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Id. at 141.
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Id. at 151 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Earl M. Maltz, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions—A Response to
Professor McConnell, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 228 (1996).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 228–29; see also Earl M. Maltz, A Dissenting Opinion to Brown, 20 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 93, 94 (1995) (The Fourteenth Amendment “was in large measure a campaign document,
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Consider Robert Bork’s original-intent analysis of Brown. In Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,278 he urged that a court deciding
the issue before the Brown Court would identify two facts.279 Fact 1: “[T]he men
who put the amendment in the Constitution intended that the Supreme Court should
secure against government action some large measure of racial equality. That is
certainly the core meaning of the amendment.”280 Fact 2: “[T]hose same men were
not agreed about what the concept of racial equality requires.”281
What was the intent of those men? Bork stated that some believed “that blacks
were entitled to purchase property from any willing seller but not to attend integrated
schools, or that they were entitled to serve on juries but not to intermarry with whites,
or that they were entitled to equal physical facilities but that the facilities should be
separate.”282 He asserted that the Brown Court could not “know how these long-dead
men” would have voted on these issues, but did know that the amendment “was
intended to enforce a core idea of black equality against governmental
discrimination.”283 Contending that the Court could not require equality in some but
not other cases, Bork concluded that the Court had to “choose a general principle of
equality that applie[d] to all cases.”284 For Bork, that (his) equality principle justified
the Court’s choice of a no-segregation rule over Plessy’s separate-but-equal
doctrine.285
As can be seen, Bork made two discretionary and outcome-influential
interpretive moves. First, he noted but set to the side the pro-segregation views of
the aforementioned long-dead men who amended the Constitution. Second, Bork’s
formulation of a core ideal of black equality is the foundation for his conclusion that
school segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause. Bork’s conclusion that
Brown was rightly decided was reached via a (his) theory of black equality,
concededly not recognized by, and certainly not consistent with, the intent of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers. And his determination that the Framers intended
to secure an undefined large measure of equality expands the protective scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment beyond that provision’s civil rights focus.
B. Original-Understanding Originalism
Years later, Bork moved from original intent to original-understanding
originalism in his book The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the
Law.286 He argued that the “inescapable fact is that those who ratified the amendment
did not think it outlawed segregated education or segregation in any aspect of
278
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life.”287 Bork also assumed that Plessy v. Ferguson correctly represented the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, “that equality and state-compelled
separation of the races were consistent.”288 He supposed, in addition, that the
amendment’s ratifiers did not object to the psychological harm suffered by those
subjected to segregation.289 “If those things are true, then it is impossible to square
the opinion in Brown with the original understanding.”290
Notwithstanding these observations, Bork concluded that Brown’s result “is
consistent with, indeed is compelled by, the original understanding” of the Equal
Protection Clause.291 Consider his result-squaring argument. When the Court
decided Brown in 1954, “it had been apparent for some time that segregation rarely
if ever produced equality.” Thus, the Court faced “a situation in which the courts
would have to go on forever entertaining litigation about primary schools, secondary
schools, colleges, washrooms, golf courses, swimming pools, drinking fountains,
and the endless variety of facilities that were segregated, or else the separate-butequal doctrine would have to be abandoned.”292 Bork believed that the Court had to
choose between two “mutually inconsistent” options: (1) allow segregation and
“abandon the quest for equality” or (2) “forbid segregation in order to achieve
equality.”293 For Bork, the choice was clear—“the Court must choose equality and
prohibit state-imposed segregation. The purpose that brought the fourteenth
amendment into being was equality before the law, and equality, not separation, was
written into the text.”294 An opinion in Brown based on this approach “would have
clearly been rooted in the original understanding, and its legitimacy would have been
enhanced for those troubled by the way in which the Court arrived at a moral result
without demonstrating its mooring in the historic Constitution.”295
Bork’s framing and choice of equality over state-imposed segregation is neither
obvious nor compelled. The word “equality” is not found in the text of the Equal
Protection Clause;296 nor is a ban on racial separation.297 Yet, as he did in 1971, Bork
formulated and applied his own concept of equality grounded in his own valuepartial view298 of the Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose. This discretionary move is
especially questionable given facts and history demonstrating that “segregation was
287
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See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 344 (2008) (“There is nothing in the
term ‘equal protection’ that seems to forbid separation, even separation on grounds ordinarily
considered invidious, such as sex and race . . . .”).
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not necessarily contrary to this nation’s notion of equality” circa 1866–1868299 (as
Bork concedes), and that the amendment did not address or protect the social rights
of black children.300 Bork’s discretionary originalism is grounded, not in the
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers, but in his own
nonoriginalist assumptions, premises, and preferences. His conclusion that Brown’s
result is consistent with and compelled by the original understanding of the Equal
Protection Clause is thus fundamentally flawed and egregiously incorrect.
Another constitutional theorist, Michael Perry, argues that Brown was correctly
decided.301 For Perry, the “originalist approach correctly understood” asks “the
fundamental question about the meaning of a provision of the constitutional text . .
.: What directive (or directives) did the people—or those who represented them, in
particular the ratifiers—understand the provision to communicate; what directive
does the provision, as originally understood, represent?”302 The state action at issue
in Brown implicates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause,
Perry submits; that provision refers, among other things, to the fundamental right to
liberty and to basic rights of property and contract.303 The clause “protects, by its
very terms, not merely some of the privileges and immunities enjoyed by citizens
under state law, but all of them.”304 Therefore, he concluded, state provision of a free
public education to white citizens cannot constitutionally be denied to nonwhite
citizens.305 “Unquestionably, then, the state laws at issue in Brown violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . . [T]hey violated the directive represented by the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as that clause was originally understood.”306
Is Perry correct? While his argument that the terms of the clause can be read as
protecting all and not some privileges or immunities is a plausible one, evaluating
that position as an originalist matter is difficult given the absence of facts and
specific evidence supporting his conclusion that the ratifiers understood that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause mandated the invalidation of school segregation.
The absence of such evidence is of critical significance, for the question remains
whether Perry’s approach can be squared with the Reconstruction-era view that the
Fourteenth Amendment protected civil but not social rights.307 Does he dispute that
era’s taxonomy of rights? Did the ratifiers hold or not hold this view? What facts
299
Ronald Turner, Was “Separate but Equal” Constitutional?: Borkian Originalism
and Brown, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 229, 259 (1995).
300
Id. at 231.
301
Michael J. Perry, Brown, Bolling, & Originalism: Why Ackerman and Posner
(Among Others) Are Wrong, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 53, 54 (1995).
302
Id.
303
See id. at 60–62.
304
Id. at 64.
305
See id. at 66.
306
Id.; see also MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE SUPREME COURT 91 (1999) (arguing that “a law creating one set of schools for
white students and another set for students of African ancestry” is inconsistent with the
privileges or immunities norm established by the “[w]e the people” generation).
307
See supra notes 175–181 and accompanying text.

2015]

BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

1185

and evidence must one consider and evaluate in determining an, or the, answer to
this question? Conclusory assertions are no substitute for a rigorous and evidencebased originalist analysis of the school segregation question.
C. Original Public Meaning Originalism
Original public meaning originalists have also argued and concluded that
Brown is an originalist decision. This section provides an overview of the following
advocates of this view: Justice Scalia, Michael McConnell, Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Steven Calabresi, and Michael Perl.
What has Justice Scalia, a prominent advocate of original public meaning
originalism, said about Brown? Recall that the Justice has made clear that he looks
for the original and most plausible meaning of constitutional text to the adopting
society.308 He has also instructed that those searching for that meaning must immerse
themselves “in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the time.”309
With regard to Brown, Justice Scalia has argued in a dissenting opinion that
“the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of ‘equal protection of the laws,’
combined with the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of the institution of black
slavery, leaves no room for doubt that laws treating people differently because of
their race are invalid.”310 He stated further that “even if one does not regard the
Fourteenth Amendment as crystal clear on this point, a tradition of unchallenged
validity did not exist with respect to the practice in Brown,”311 as the separate-butequal doctrine was challenged as unconstitutional and upheld by the Supreme Court
in Plessy v. Ferguson over the dissent of Justice Harlan.312
Justice Scalia’s analysis is a notable illustration of discretionary originalism.
His argument that the Equal Protection Clause is “crystal clear” and unambiguously
prohibits segregation rests on his reading of the text of the Equal Protection Clause
and the Thirteenth Amendment and his view of the significance of Homer Plessy’s
challenge to the separate-but-equal doctrine rejected by the Court twenty-eight years
after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. That an original public circa 1866–
1868 would have agreed with Justice Scalia’s interpretation is a doubtful and frankly
incredible proposition. What is obvious and crystal clear to him is not indisputably
obvious at all. And how does the Plessy decision issued twenty-eight years after the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment—a seven-to-one decision validating the
separate-but-equal doctrine—in any way demonstrate or even suggest that the
original public meaning of the amendment prohibited school segregation?
More recently, in his book Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts,313
Justice Scalia and his coauthor Bryan Garner submit that a “frequent line of attack
308

See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
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against originalism consists in appeal to popular Supreme Court decisions that are
assertedly based on a rejection of original meaning.”314 The authors refer to Brown
as the most cited example of the view that “only nonoriginalism could have produced
. . . generally acclaimed results.”315 This is not so, Justice Scalia and Garner contend,
for the text of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause “can reasonably be thought to prohibit all laws designed to assert
the separateness and superiority of the white race, even those that purport to treat
the races equally. Justice John Marshall Harlan took this position in his powerful
(and thoroughly originalist) dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.”316
The characterization of Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent as in any way, let alone
thoroughly, originalist and supportive of the result in Brown is dubious. Recall that
while Justice Harlan argued that the challenged separate-but-equal law in Plessy
unconstitutionally violated an African American’s civil rights,317 neither he nor the
Plessy majority departed from or rejected the Reconstruction-era division of rights
into civil, political, and social categories.318 An interpreter who subscribed to that
trichotomy approach could consistently and simultaneously determine that the
Fourteenth Amendment (1) required the invalidation of the separate-but-equal
doctrine as applied to the civil right to desegregated public transportation (as did
Justice Harlan, but not the Plessy majority) and (2) did not require the invalidation
of state laws mandating racial segregation as applied to the claimed social right to
attend desegregated public schools. Thus, Justice Harlan’s civil-rights-focused
Plessy dissent in no way supports the constitutional recognition of a social right to
attend a racially integrated public school. Failure to comprehend and adhere to the
Reconstruction-era taxonomy of rights attributes to Justice Harlan views he did not
hold, and invoking Harlan tells us nothing about the posited original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment held by the public at the time of the provision’s adoption in
1868.
A significant contribution to the discussion of originalism and Brown is found
in Michael McConnell’s Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions.319
Addressing the “supposed inconsistency between Brown and the original meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment,”320 McConnell studied “the legal thinking of the
antagonists in the debate” over the Civil Rights Act of 1875.321 In doing so, he
posited that congressional actions to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment taken
between 1868 and 1875 constitute the best evidence of the original meaning of the
amendment as applied to the school segregation question.322
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Note McConnell’s discretionary move and interpretive choice. Instead of
focusing on the Fourteenth Amendment’s 1866–1868 framing-ratification period, he
examines a seven-year post-adoption period culminating in the enactment of the
1875 Civil Rights Act.323 Congress debated the constitutionality of school
segregation as it considered the bill that ultimately became law in 1875 but struck
from that legislation a provision outlawing school segregation.324 For McConnell,
this congressional refusal to legislatively proscribe public school segregation did not
foreclose the conclusion that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited such segregation.
[I]f instead we assume that the courts must interpret the Amendment in
light of its most probable understood meaning at the time it was enacted,
and if we treat the opinions of the congressmen as evidence of the opinions
of informed people of the day, what should we make of this debate? That
is, viewing this episode not as an act of lawmaking but as evidence of
contemporaneous interpretation, what do we learn about the meaning that
people at that time attached to the words of the Fourteenth Amendment?325
On this view, the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is the same
as and can be established by an examination of the opinions of members of Congress.
This approach combines two different and potentially conflicting theories—
Framers’ original intent and original public meaning.326
McConnell argued that a substantial portion of the members of Congress,
including members who participated in the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment,
held the view that school segregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment.327 He
acknowledged that proof that a congressional majority supported legislation banning
school segregation in the time period of 1871–1875 does not convincingly establish
that that was the predominant understanding of those who framed and ratified the
amendment in the 1866–1868 time period.328 Positing continuity in opinion from
1866 to the enactment of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, he stated that a number of
323

Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, invalidated by The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25–26 (1883).
324
McConnell, supra note 14, at 1092–93.
325
Id. at 1093.
326
See Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical
as it Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 260 (2005) (“McConnell’s work can be viewed as
focusing more on original intent than on original meaning . . . .”).
327
Michael Klarman does not share this view. He has argued that school desegregation
was not favored in the North at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, and that
“Northern opinion in 1875 was more favorable toward school desegregation than it had been
in 1866–68. Thus congressional debates on the 1875 [Civil Rights Act] seem unreliable
evidence as to what congressmen thought the Fourteenth Amendment meant when they
passed it in 1866.” Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory, supra note
175, at 1904–05 (citation omitted).
328
See McConnell, supra note 14, at 1105.
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“leaders of the movement to adopt the Fourteenth Amendment” supported the
movement for the 1875 legislation.329 This supposed continuity may not have
existed, however, given the material shift in opinions regarding the desirability of
school integration during the interim between the 1868 adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the 1875 legislation.330
McConnell also assumed that the majority of both Houses of Congress voting
in 1872–1874 for legislation that would have desegregated public schools
“understood themselves to be enforcing the dictates of the Constitution and not
merely deciding whether they believed public schools should be segregated.”331 A
vote for a law prohibiting school segregation was, for McConnell, “an implicit (and
often an explicit) statement regarding the congressman’s interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”332 “Thus, if it is established that a majority supported
legislation to forbid school segregation under Section 5 [of the Fourteenth
Amendment], this proves that the majority understood the Fourteenth Amendment
to forbid the racial segregation of public schools.”333 This analysis is speculative and
conjectural, for as previously noted, a provision outlawing school segregation that
may have obtained the imagined majority support was struck from the legislation.334
Turning to Brown, McConnell observed that the opinion “gives every
impression that the Court thought it was struggling against the historical
understanding and original meaning of the Constitution—an impression that, I am
now convinced, was unnecessary and even misleading.”335 To McConnell, the
question is what the Fourteenth Amendment meant to “the great mass of citizens and
their representatives” and not to the amendment’s proponents and enemies.336 In
McConnell’s view, hostility to the amendment by “a significant segment of the
population . . . is utterly irrelevant to its meaning,”337 and the intention of the
amendment’s “most avid proponents” did not matter.338
McConnell recognized that school segregation was a widespread practice in
both southern and northern states and the District of Columbia at the time of the
proposed and ratified Fourteenth Amendment, and that school segregation “almost
certainly enjoyed the support of a majority of the population even at the height of
329

Id.
See Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory, supra note 175, at
1903–04.
331
McConnell, supra note 14, at 1110.
332
Id. at 1117.
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See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
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Id. at 1133.
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Reconstruction.”339 He thus doubted that Congress would have proposed and that
the people of the states would have ratified “an Amendment understood to outlaw
so deeply engrained an institutional practice.”340 If one stops here, the answer to the
question “Did the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment circa 1866–1868
prohibit school segregation?” would be “no.”
But McConnell did not stop there. As previously noted, he shifted the temporal
focus away from the 1866–1868 proposal-ratification period to the post-ratification
period of 1868–1875.341 That discretionary and postoriginalist choice and move
selects a time period that does not include the inconvenient facts noted in the
preceding paragraph.342 In answering “yes” to the question “Did the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment circa 1868–1875 prohibit school
segregation?,” McConnell formulated and applied a theory of originalism more
conducive to his originalist defense of the result in Brown.
It is also noteworthy that McConnell’s focus on the 1868–1875 time period
does not discuss in depth an important and relevant event occurring a few years after
the enactment of the 1875 act, the Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877.343 Addressing
disputed results in the presidential election of 1876 between Republican candidate
Rutherford B. Hayes and Democratic candidate Samuel J. Tilden, Congress created
a fifteen-person commission to resolve the election issue.344 When the commission
ruled in favor of Hayes, he promised Democrats that, in exchange for their
acceptance of the commission’s decision, he would withdraw federal troops from
the South and would not enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s ban on racial
discrimination in voting.345 That deal was accepted, Hayes assumed the presidency,
and federal troops were removed from the South.346 This development betrayed and
ended Reconstruction and was followed by “a sea-change in public, intellectual,
governmental and legal opinion. Support and protection for the rights of black

339
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citizens passed away and were replaced by the regime of Jim Crow.”347 Expanding
the 1868–1875 review period by a few years brings into the sociopolitical and legal
picture a significant development of great relevance to an argument grounded in a
purported postoriginalist public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Now consider Michael Stokes Paulsen’s recent argument that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits public school segregation.348 Paulsen “focuses on the
objective original linguistic meaning of the words of the text, in context, rather than
on the subjective intentions or expectations of specific persons involved in the
process of enacting them—a distinction foundational to written
constitutionalism.”349 In his view, the text of the Equal Protection Clause “appear[s]
to state a sufficiently determinate rule that the government may not treat classes of
persons differently and adversely for purposes of legal privileges and entitlements
because of race.”350 Noting that “[t]here is perhaps some room to argue about
whether this is the necessary meaning of the words of the text, and over the exact
scope of the principle stated,” he concludes that this “is not much of a textual stretch
at all: it is a reasonably straight-line reading of the language; if there is room to argue
over this reading, it is not a great deal of room.”351 Paulsen thus reads and chooses
to construct a clause purposefully written at a high level of generality as if it sets
forth a governing rule written at a narrow and specific level of generality.352
Does public school segregation on the basis of race violate Paulsen’s Equal
Protection Clause’s rule/principle?353 Referring to the “real-world factual and social
347
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context” of racial segregation practices in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
Paulsen states that the answer to that question “was an embarrassingly obvious
yes.”354 That “not all persons in the generation that drafted and ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment” comprehended “this [was] largely beside the point” and
did “not alter the meaning of the language used in the Constitution” or “the reality
that racial segregation violated that meaning.”355 Accordingly, “Brown was rightly
decided . . . on reasonably straightforward textual-interpretation reasoning.”356
Paulsen’s certainty that Brown was correctly decided as an original matter must
not mask critical interpretive choices made en route to that conclusion. His textualist
focus on an objective original linguistic meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is
different from the textualist methodology proposed in his earlier work. Recall that
Paulsen and his coauthor declared (1) that the words and phrases of the Constitution
must be applied “in accordance with the meaning they would have had at the time
they were adopted as law, within the political and linguistic community that adopted
the text as law,” and (2) that this methodology asks how those words and phrases
“would have been understood by a hypothetical, objective, reasonably wellinformed reader of those words and phrases, in context, at the time they were
adopted, and within the political and linguistic community in which they were
adopted.”357 His analysis discussed in the two preceding paragraphs does not
explicitly assess the original meaning at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment; nor does he expressly inquire about the adoption-time understanding
of a hypothetical reasonable person in a particular political and linguistic
community. In his 2013 analysis view, the views of the drafting and ratifying
generations do not matter. The text prohibits racial discrimination. For Paulsen,
nothing more is needed.
More—much more—is needed, however, for those who do not accept
Paulsen’s view that the text of the Equal Protection Clause sets out a determinate
rule and principle governing the resolution of the school segregation issue. Paulsen’s
proffered no-race-discrimination approach does what the Fourteenth Amendment’s
drafting committee did not do.358 The text of the adopted clause, framed and written
at a higher level of generality, does not expressly refer to race, does not explicitly
require equality, and does not forbid racial segregation.359 While the provision’s
“general concern—equality—is clear enough,’” the “content beyond that cannot be
derived from anything within its four corners . . . .”360
If Paulsen is correct that state-mandated racial discrimination violates the Equal
Protection Clause, the question remains whether as an original matter the clause
prohibits racial discrimination in all of its forms and manifestations. As Paulsen
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notes, the exact scope of an equality principle is arguable.361 At the time of the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, that scope did not encompass and protect
the social right to a desegregated public school education.362 If this is correct, the
no-race-discrimination rule/principle he finds in the text is consistent with
contemporary approaches to and understandings of the Equal Protection Clause, but
it is not consistent with—indeed is contrary to—the adoption-time original meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause.
Additionally, Paulsen’s analysis refers to an unspecified factual and social
context of nineteenth- and twentieth-century practices of racial segregation.363 This
is a finding of original linguistic meaning informed and confirmed by events
occurring long after the drafting and ratification period which were obviously and
by definition not known to those living in mid-nineteenth-century America.
Another recent originalist effort to justify the result in Brown is found in Steven
Calabresi and Michael Perl’s article Originalism and Brown v. Board of
Education.364 Making a legal argument that “is complex and could easily have been
missed by many, if not most, Americans living in 1868,”365 the authors argue that
“the right to a public school education was already by 1868 a fundamental state
constitutional right of state citizenship and that segregation in public schools was
therefore unconstitutional from 1868 on.”366 In fact, they contend, “Brown is only
justifiable on originalist grounds—at least if one focuses on the right to a public
school education as it stood in state constitutional law in 1868 and in 1954.”367
Calabresi and Perl state that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment “was
publicly understood as providing a constitutional basis for the Civil Rights Act of
1866, which in turn protected the civil rights of individuals, but not their political
rights.”368 (Note the absence of any reference to social rights.)369 In their view, the
rights specifically protected by the 1866 statute370 were not the only fundamental
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause;
that clause also protects “fundamental civil rights that are deeply rooted in American
history and tradition.”371 Thus, they argue, “[a]ny right that existed widely in 1868,
the year the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, could fairly be argued to be a
fundamental right that is deeply rooted in American history and tradition and . . . is
therefore a ‘Privilege or Immunity’ of national or state citizenship.”372 And, they
361
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further contend, any right protected in 1868 by more than three-quarters of the state
constitutions—the number of states required to amend the Constitution pursuant to
Article V of the Constitution373—“is a strong candidate to be a Fourteenth
Amendment fundamental right.”374
By the authors’ count, in 1868 the constitutions of thirty of the thirty-seven
states in the union explicitly required the establishment of a public school system;
three states required school funding but did not mandate public schools; and four
states did not recognize the right to a free public education.375 “It is thus as clear as
day that there was an Article V consensus of three-quarters of the states in 1868 that
recognized that children have a fundamental right to a free public school
education.”376 That right was “a privilege or immunity of state citizenship . . . as to
which racial discrimination was forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. The
outcome of Brown v. Board of Education was thus a correct outcome not only in
1954 but also in 1868.”377 Calabresi and Perl acknowledge that their fundamentality
analysis runs counter to San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,378
wherein the Court held that there is no fundamental right to a public school education
under the Equal Protection Clause.379 Expressing no opinion as to whether Rodriguez
was correctly decided, they argue that it is possible that Rodriguez was wrongly
decided on the basis of the erroneous assumption that there is no right to a public
education.380 They also note that Rodriguez did not employ their count-the-states
analysis and consider the fact that three-quarters of state constitutions in effect in
1868 recognized the right to a public school education, a “fact [that] is obviously
relevant to the question of whether the right to an education was deeply rooted in
American history and tradition.”381
Moreover, Calabresi and Perl disagree with Michael McConnell’s observation
that it was not likely that “Congress would have proposed, or the . . . states would
have ratified, an Amendment understood to outlaw [the] deeply engrained” practice
of school segregation.382 They complained that McConnell focused on the actual
373
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state practices in the 1860s and not on the text of state constitutional provisions in
place in 1868.383 Unlike the examination of state constitutions conducted in their
approach, McConnell’s approach “reflects a kind of realism that disregards the law
and the actual text of the state constitutions.”384
Calabresi and Perl’s analysis is problematic in several respects. First, they
recognize that their legal argument could have been missed by many if not most
Americans living in 1868. If most of the public did not know of or could not
comprehend their particular originalist approach, one must question whether and
how any original public meaning or other understanding did exist or could have
existed.
Second, Calabresi and Perl’s fundamental rights analysis imports a
nonoriginalist and itself discretionary methodology into their originalist analysis.
They cite two substantive due process cases, Washington v. Glucksberg385 and
Lawrence v. Texas,386 in which the Court employed not originalism but a separate
and distinct due process traditionalist methodology387 (an approach questioned by
383
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387
Traditionalism interprets the Constitution “in accordance with the long-standing and
evolving practices, experiences, and tradition of the nation.” Michael W. McConnell,
Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1133 (1998).
Traditionalism is thus different from and should not be confused with originalism’s search
for the fixed meaning of constitutional text. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl J. Levinson,
The Non-Retrogression Principle in Constitutional Law, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1211, 1241
(1998).
Glucksberg held that the asserted right to assistance in committing suicide was not a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
521 U.S. at 728. In so holding the Court looked to, among other things, 700 years of AngloAmerican common-law tradition punishing or disapproving of suicide and assisted suicide;
id. at 711; the common-law approach adopted by the American colonies; id.; the prohibition
of suicide in colonial and state legislatures and courts; id. at 712–13; the criminalization of
assisted suicide in most states at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868; id. at 714–15; and states’ recent reexamination and reaffirmation of the assisted suicide
ban. Id. at 715–16.
Lawrence struck down as violating the Due Process Clause a Texas statute making it a
crime for two people of the same sex to engage in certain intimate conduct. 539 U.S. 558,
578–79 (2003). The Court conducted a historical survey beginning with English criminal
laws passed in 1533 and continuing through the prohibition of sodomy in the American
384
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originalist Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas).388 The Court’s due process
traditionalism analysis is not limited to and does not seek to determine the fixed
meaning of constitutional text at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868.389 Under that approach, the Court surveys historical events and
developments at various points in time including, but not limited to, the time of the
adoption of a constitutional provision.390
Third, Calabresi and Perl’s fundamental rights/count-the-state-constitutions
analysis illustrates the importance of an interpreter’s discretion to frame the inquiry
and the level of generality at which a claimed right should be characterized. In
Glucksberg, a substantive due process decision cited by the authors, the Court
instructed that “a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest”
is required.391 The specific Fourteenth Amendment issue of the constitutionality of
state-mandated school segregation addressed in Brown is narrower than the broader
and more general claimed right to a free public education as framed by Calabresi
and Perl. Relevant and material to a careful description of the asserted interest is
evidence of the actual existence of racially segregated schools in the states and not
just the number of state constitutions containing public education provisions.
Calabresi and Perl’s sole and limited focus on the text of state constitutions ignores

colonies, the absence of state criminal prosecutions of persons engaging in same-sex
relations until the 1970s, and state abolition of criminal laws prohibiting same-sex relations
over the past few decades. Id. at 568–72. The Court then concluded that the nation’s “laws
and traditions in the past half century . . . show an emerging awareness that liberty” protects
adults with regard to their decisions concerning their private sexual conduct. Id. at 571–72.
Interestingly, in the majority opinion in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy stated that the
Framers and Ratifiers of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
“might have been more specific” if they had “known the components of liberty in its
manifold possibilities.” Id. at 578.
They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain
truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper
in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every
generation can invoke its principles on their own search for greater freedom.
Id. at 578–79. This passage clearly speaks to an evolving and not fixed constitutional
meaning.
388
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (expressing his “misgivings about Substantive Due Process as an original
matter”); id. at 3062 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing
that “the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment offers a superior alternative” to the
“legal fiction” of the Court’s substantive due process doctrine).
389
See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
390
See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
391
Id. at 721 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277–
78 (1990)).
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“the vast gap that can separate the law on the books from the law in life.”392 That the
text of a constitution proclaims a right or mandates certain protections does not mean
that that right or protection actually existed in the real world.393 Actual history, lived
experiences, and the real social meaning of racial segregation and subordination in
public education and other areas matter. A sanitized account and exclusive focus on
text renders invisible racist and white supremacist realities and fails to fully and
accurately capture the specifics and dynamics of American apartheid.
Calabresi and Perl also state that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects
traditional and deeply rooted “fundamental civil rights” and argue that any right
existing in 1868 could fairly be argued to be fundamental.394 Missing again is any
recognition that the school integration issue involved a social and not a civil right.
And the argument that any right existing in 1868 was arguably fundamental cannot
be correct in all circumstances. Some rights may have been traditional and deeply
rooted at that time; other rights in existence in 1868 may have been new or recent
and therefore non-traditional and not yet deeply rooted ones. A more specific and
precise description of the deeply rooted fundamentality approach is needed.
Fourth, and finally, Calabresi and Perl’s Article V consensus argument is a
departure from the formalist view that “the only way We the People can speak is
through the forms specified by Article V.”395 As Calabresi noted in an earlier work,
“Legitimate transformative social change only happens, as it did in 1868 . . . when
two-thirds of both houses of Congress and three-quarters of the states agree on a
textual change.”396 Calabresi and Perl’s Article V consensus argument is not
formalist, for they seek legal recognition of a purported fundamental right not
actually considered, tested, and added to the Constitution via the Article V
amendment process and by We the People. This consensus analysis is not consistent
with fixed and original public meaning originalism.
D. Framework Originalism
Jack Balkin’s framework originalism considers the concepts referred to in the
words in the Equal Protection Clause at the time of that provision’s enactment.397
“This is not purely an investigation into semantic definitions. We also want to know
392

3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 298 (2014).
See Ann Bartow, Privacy Laws and Privacy Levers: Online Surveillance Versus
Economic Development in the People’s Republic of China, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 853, 856 (2013)
(noting the “disconnect between enumerated constitutional rights” in the Chinese
Constitution “and the lived reality of Chinese people”); Paul D. Carrington, Writing Other
Peoples’ Constitutions, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 167, 172 (2007) (“The Soviet
Constitution published in 1924 proclaimed all manner of individual rights but was merely
hortatory . . . .”).
394
See supra notes 371–372 and accompanying text.
395
ACKERMAN, supra note 392, at 19.
396
Steven G. Calabresi, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Guarantee Equal Justice for
All?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 156 (2011).
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if words in the clause were understood nonliterally—for example, as a metaphor or
a synecdoche—and we want to know whether some words referred to generally
recognized terms of art.”398
For Balkin, the original meaning of the “equal protection of the laws” is
enforced “today because the text continues to require it, just as the text continues to
require that the president must be thirty-five years old.”399 Balkin submits that
today’s application of the principles of equal protection may differ from the
expectations people had in 1868 given our contemporary understandings and prior
constitutional constructions.400 Vague and abstract clauses, like the Equal Protection
Clause, “will likely reflect contemporary understandings rather than original
understandings” as principles and standards are applied in changed circumstances.401
What, then, are the underlying principles of the Equal Protection Clause?
Balkin identifies four types of prohibited unequal treatment: 1) laws making
“arbitrary and unreasonable distinctions between persons”; 2) “‘class legislation’ . .
. unjustifiably singl[ing] out a group for special benefits or special burdens”; 3)
“‘caste’ legislation . . . creat[ing] or maintain[ing] a disfavored caste or subordinated
. . . group”; and 4) legislation restricting the “basic rights of citizenship” and treating
persons as “second-class citizens.”402
Balkin concludes that state-mandated racial segregation in public schools
violates these principles.403 Accordingly, Brown is an “obvious and uncomplicated
application[] of the principles underlying the Fourteenth Amendment” and is a
constitutional construction “foundational to our understanding of the equal
protection clause.”404 Not bound by expected applications or the original public
meaning or Framers’ intent or ratifiers’ understandings, Balkin’s heuristic and
discretionary framework analysis of the Equal Protection Clause easily squares
Brown with his originalist theory.
***
As demonstrated in this Part, the constitutional originalism employed by those
addressing and answering in the affirmative the question whether Brown can be
squared with and justified by originalism is in fact a discretionary interpretive
methodology. Consider these discretionary moves:
1. The formulation of a core idea of black equality protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment and putting the Brown Court to the choice of equality or segregation
(Bork).
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2. A textualist approach to the Privileges or Immunities Clause yielding a noschool-segregation directive not found in the text of that provision and not consistent
with the Reconstruction-era taxonomy of rights (Perry).
3. Combining the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the
Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery and invoking Justice Harlan’s dissent
in Plessy v. Ferguson (Justice Scalia).
4. A focus on the post-adoption time period of 1868–1875 instead of the 1866–
1868 proposal/ratification period of the Fourteenth Amendment (McConnell).
5. The formulation of a posited and textually derived determinate
rule/principle violated by public school racial segregation and characterizing as
beside the point the views of those in the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafting and
ratifying generation (Paulsen).
6. The articulation of a legal argument so complex that it could have been
missed by those living in 1868, and the finding that by 1868 and as of 1954 the right
to a public school education was fundamental and school segregation was therefore
unconstitutional (Calabresi and Perl).
7. A framework originalist analysis identifying and applying underlying
principles of the Equal Protection Clause and concluding that public school
segregation on the basis of race violates those principles (Balkin).
These moves and choices and the marking of different paths to the Brown-isoriginalist terminus do not meaningfully constrain interpreter discretion, nor do they
faithfully and consistently seek the discoverable intent, understanding, or public
meaning of a constitutional provision at the time of its adoption. Originalists seeking
to demonstrate that Brown was rightly decided have clearly exercised discretion in
ways that call into question the claimed constraining and restraining functions of
originalism.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined originalists’ efforts to demonstrate that the result
reached by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education is consistent with
and justified by originalism. As discussed herein, originalism is a discretionary
interpretive methodology presenting originalists with several interpretive choice
points and ample room for the introduction of an interpreter’s preferences,
predilections, values, and beliefs. That discretion has been exercised in originalist
accounts contending (wrongly, in my view) that Brown’s invalidation of statemandated racial segregation in public schools can be squared with the original intent,
understanding, or public meaning of the Reconstruction-era Fourteenth Amendment.
The concern that an interpretive approach leading to the conclusion that Brown
was wrongly decided would not pass “the acid test” of originalism405 need not lead
to the concoction of “implausible accounts of the Reconstruction Era understanding
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of segregation.”406 “Man is not the measure of all things, as Socrates replied to the
Sophists, and neither is Brown . . . . An interpretation of the Constitution is not wrong
because it would produce a different result in Brown.”407 One could thus conclude
that under a preferred interpretive methodology Brown was wrongly decided without
calling into question the general validity of that methodology.408 While this would
not alleviate the concern of some that such a conclusion could discredit originalism,
it would be a candid acknowledgment that undiluted and unflinching originalism
can in fact lead to an undesirable result and outcome (for example, school
segregation does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment). Such methodological
purity and consistency could reduce the temptation to make and act on discretionary
and outcome-influential choices that evade and avoid the Brown-was-wronglydecided position.
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Dorf, supra note 16, at 958.
John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1463 n.295 (1992).
408
See VERMEULE, supra note 16, at 280. Vermeule advocates a Thayerian regime of
judicial review in which judges defer to the legislatures and administrative agencies when
the meaning of legal text is not clear and specific. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 142–43
(1893). Vermeule acknowledges that on this view “Brown was indeed wrong, in the sense
that the judges had no business deciding that sort of question in the first place.” VERMEULE,
supra note 16, at 280. While “[t]here is no general mechanism that can produce only happy
endings,” under Vermeule’s approach the Court would not have “declared a constitutional
right to own slaves,” “invalidated a generation’s worth of legislation against child labor,” or
“invalidated congressional attempts to provide legal redress for gender-motivated violence.”
Id. at 281.
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